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I. INTRODUCTION
Now is the ideal time to study the limitations and possibilities of a global
gay rights movement. The term "gay" has been borrowed into Japanese,
Portuguese, Spanish, Thai, Turkish, and other languages, signifying its
increasingly perceived universality.' Gay and lesbian organizations now exist
in virtually every continent and in many major urban centers throughout the
world.2 A growing number of legislators and judges have taken up the cause of
gay civil rights, and have actively supported protections based on sexual
orientation in a host of areas, such as adoption, employment, domestic
partnership, and immigration. 3  Throughout these global developments,
American activists, scholars and media figures have played a visible role,
leading at least one commentator to characterize gay pride as "America's
global gay export.",
4
Nevertheless, although the struggle for gay rights has attracted enormous
global attention in the past decade, it has also encountered many challenges.5
A number of governments, particularly across the developing world, have
mounted vocal, and often violent, attacks against nascent gay and lesbian
movements within their borders. For example, in Namibia, just last year,
Home Affairs Minister Jerry Ekandjo told the National Assembly that the
existence of homosexuality was entirely attributable to Western influences,
observing "[w]e take everything [from Western culture] lock, stock, and barrel
without carefully analyzing what is good and what is harmful to us. Today it is
homosexuality, tomorrow the right to walk naked, the day after it will be the
right to abuse drugs. At the end the so-called rights will lead to our own
1. Stephen 0. Murray, Increasingly Gay Self-Representations of Male-Male Sexual Experiences in
Thailand, in LADY Boys, TOM Boys, RENT Boys: MALE AND FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY THAILAND 82 (Peter A. Jackson & Gerard Sullivan eds., 1999); Deborah P. Amory,
Mashoga, Mabasha, and Magai: 'Homosexuality' on the East African Coast, in BOY-WIVES AND
FEMALE HUSBANDS: STUDIES OF AFRICAN HOMOSEXUALITIES 70, 76 (Stephen 0. Murray & Will
Roscoe eds., 1998).
2. Oliver C. Phillips, Constituting the Global Gay, in LAW AND SEXUALITY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA
17 (Carl Stynchin & Didi Herman eds., 2000); Barry D. Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak, & Andre
Krouwel, in Introduction to THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS: NATIONAL
IMPRINTS OF A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT I (Barry D. Adam et al. eds., 1999).
3. See generally THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS, supra note 2 (detailing
worldwide developments).
4. FRANK BROWNING, A QUEER GEOGRAPHY 24 (1998). See also Dennis Altman, Global
Queering, 5 AUSTRALIAN HUMANITIES REV. 2 (1996) (observing that the modem gay identity in Jakarta
and elsewhere is influenced by Western trends and the marketing of gay culture internationally.);
Neville Hoad, Between the White Man's Burden and the White Man's Disease, 5 GAY & LESBIAN Q.
559, 563 (1999) ("There is a certain banal truth to allegations of U.S. cultural imperialism particularly in
regard to gay male identity in South Africa (and, arguably, in much of the world). Gay culture.., like
Coca-Cola, Madonna, and Calvin Klein underwear, has become a potent American export.").
5. Amnesty International lists at least eighty-three countries where homosexuality or sodomy is




extinction.,,6 In this leader's view, "so-called gay rights can never qualify as
human rights" because they are "inimical to true Namibian culture, African
culture, and religion."7 Such commentary represents the point of view shared
by some political leaders that indigenous homosexuality fails to exist in non-
Western countries, and that the formation of gay communities is an undesirable
byproduct of foreign influence and globalization.
As we realize that the struggle for gay civil rights is becoming more global,
we must necessarily also confront an uncomfortable reality: for many
politicians, the identity "gay" or "lesbian" is perceived to be tantamount to a
foreign threat. Yet rather than addressing the complex questions of identity,
culture, and sexuality raised by the increasingly transnational posture of the gay
civil rights movement, legal scholars have remained painfully silent. Their
silence is vexing, particularly given the influx of recent anthropological and
social constructionist scholarship that actively challenges the prevailing
assumption that concepts of sexual orientation can be universally generalized
across different cultures and behaviors.8 Even though the performance of
same-sex sexual conduct has occurred throughout recorded history, the
emergence of a tangible gay and lesbian identity is an extremely recent
development. 9 As one author observes, in India, to commit a homosexual act is
one thing; to be a homosexual is an entirely different phenomenon. 10 As this
observation suggests, this divergence between identity and conduct raises the
difficult question of whether sexual orientation itself is a culturally specific
concept. 11
Such questions have undeniable legal consequences, particularly for the
minoritizing discourse that animates the global gay civil rights movement.
Traditionally, the law presumes that one's sexual orientation-heterosexual,
homosexual, bisexual-is a fixed identity defined by the gender of one's
chosen sexual partner. However, contrary to this view, some cultures view
6. Namibian Call to 'Eliminate' Gays, PLANET OUT NEWS, at
http://www.planetout.comnews/article/2000.10.02/1 (Oct. 2, 2000).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., GILBERT HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES (1997); Ken Plummer, Speaking
its Name: Inventing a Gay and Lesbian Studies, in MODERN HOMOSEXUALITIES: FRAGMENTS OF
LESBIAN AND GAY EXPERIENCE 17 (Ken Plummer ed., 1992); ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR (Evelyn Blackwood, ed. 1986).
9. See Nii Ajin, West African Homoeroticism: West African Men Who Have Sex with Men, in BOY-
WIVES AND FEMALE HUSBANDS, supra note 1, at 129, 138 (observing that the terms "heterosexuality"
and "homosexuality" are modem cultural productions), citing David Halperin, Sex Before Sexuality:
Pederasty, Politics, and Power in Classical Athens, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY 37, 48 (Martin
Duberman, et al. eds.,1989).
10. Rajesh Dhir, Men who Have Sex with Men and the Law, at
www.hri.ca/partners/lc/unitihomosexuality.shtml (January 1999). See also Hoad, supra note 4, at 564
("Lesbian and gay identity can be figured as a Western import, although no one can claim a monopoly
on acts that to a Western eye look homosexual."); and David Halperin, Homosexuality: A Cultural
Construct, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY at 41-53, 46 (1990).
11. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Content of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 461 n.2
(2000).
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homosexuality as an activity, not an identity; 12 others view it as a necessary
phase in a quest for full-fledged adulthood; 13 and still others equate it with
transgenderism. 14  Although there is certainly an appreciable emergence of
self-identified "gay" or "lesbian" individuals throughout the world, many
Western activists and scholars often fail to recognize that arguments for legal
protection on the basis of sexual orientation often collide with, rather than
incorporate, these preexisting social meanings of same-sex sexual activity. In
other words, the presumed equation between sexual conduct, sexual
orientation, and sexual identity, so prevalent in Western legal thought, tends to
swiftly unravel when viewed in a cross-cultural framework. 5
These complexities are not just differences in translation; they have
profound implications for the constitutional, civil and criminal rights affecting
sexual minorities across the world. In this Article, I argue that gay and lesbian
activists have made a divisive mistake by singlehandedly focusing on identity-
based protections in order to achieve equality for sexual minorities. When
considered in a cross-cultural context, identity-based protections actually reveal
their own inherently self-destructive limitations, demonstrating a central
paradox of global gay rights discourse. Instead of liberating sexual minorities,
the use of identity-based frameworks may paradoxically exclude them from
protection. I contend, therefore, that a global gay rights movement must take
into account sexualities and behaviors that fall outside of traditional categories
of sexual orientation. If a constitutional framework for protection of sexual
minorities is to be globally effective, it must recognize that many individuals
who fall outside of neatly circumscribed categories of sexual identity are just as
deserving of a model of liberation that includes them.
While this Article stops short of advocating a culturally relativistic
approach to gay civil rights in general, it does argue that the changing social
12. Rudolf P. Gaudio, Male Lesbians and Other Queer Notions in Hausa, in BOY-WIVES AND
FEMALE HUSBANDS, supra note 1, at 117-118. One man reported after studying homosexual activity in
Nigeria:
If "gay" is seen to refer only to the overt, politicized gay communities that have emerged in
the West in the past one hundred years, it surely does not apply to the Hausa men I met in
Nigeria, most of whom have little if any knowledge of Western gay life. If, however, "gay"
is understood to refer to men who are conscious of themselves as men who have sex with
men, and who consider themselves to be socially (if not temperamentally) distinct from men
who do not have this kind of sex, then these Hausa men are undoubtedly "gay," and it is in
this sense I use it. This is not to say that Hausa gay men understand their sexuality as do
North American gay men. For example, Hausa people generally refer to homosexuality as an
act rather than a psychological drive or predisposition, and homosexual men are more often
described as men who do homosexuality than as men who want other men sexually.
Id. (emphasis in original).
13. HERDT, supra note 8, at 109-125.
14. Matthew W. Roberts, Emergence of Gay Identity and Gay Social Movements in Developing
Countries: The AIDS Crisis as Catalyst, 20 ALTERNATIVES 243, 247 (1995).
15. In this article, I define "sexual orientation" as the "erotic or affectational impulse to the same
and/or opposite sex." JOHN C. GONSEIRECH & JAMES D. WEINRICH, HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1991). 1 define one's "sexual identity" as the outward expression
of one's sexual orientation, although others have used the term to refer to one's gender identity as well.
See e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussed infra Part IV).
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meanings surrounding gay or lesbian sexual identities raise deeply complex
questions that are often ignored by scholars and activists in the name of
globalizing gay civil rights. For laws based on sexual orientation impose-and
require-a certain relationship between identity and conduct that is deeply
context-specific. By exploring other permutations of the relationship between
identity and same-sex sexual conduct, we can come to a better understanding of
some of the complexities that accompany nascent gay civil rights movements
in other cultural contexts. This understanding, in turn, casts a new light over
America's own battles over gay civil rights, because these differences highlight
the importance of sexual autonomy and sexual self-determination over identity-
based categories of protection.
I begin, therefore, by exploring the roots of the most prominent model of
gay civil rights (particularly in domestic American law) which is based upon a
specific relationship between sexual identity and sexual conduct that I call
"substitutive." The substitutive model assumes that one's public sexual
identity and private sexual conduct are interchangeable; that is, individuals who
engage in same-sex sexual conduct can be legally classified by a fixed and
clearly demarcable gay, lesbian, or bisexual sexual identity. Based on this
equation, gay civil rights activists tend to opt between two strategies of
constitutional protection: privacy-based strategies (which protect same-sex
sexual conduct) or identity-based anti-discrimination strategies (which protect
against discrimination based on sexual orientation). In the United States, I
argue that identity-based strategies became uniquely necessary in the wake of
Bowers v. Hardwick. Because that opinion foreclosed constitutional protection
for private sexual behavior between members of the same sex, future
generations of litigants were forced to explore protections based on sexual
identity as an alternate means of protection.
Such efforts, although markedly successful in decentering the import of
Hardwick, masked the potentially uncomfortable reality that sexual identity is
not always a fixed and central category. In the sections that follow, drawing
upon both anthropological and public health literature, I explain why the
presumed equation between sexual behavior, sexual desire and sexual identity
in such strategies swiftly unravels when viewed in a cross-cultural
framework. 16 By focusing on a series of examples from Thailand and India,
among other places, I demonstrate how this "substitutive" model of sexual
16. As this Article points out, there are various typologies of homosexualities that defy the label of
"gay," "lesbian," or even "bisexual" and therefore pose serious challenges to the bedrock of assumptions
upon which gay civil rights movements are premised. See, e.g., the typologies introduced in HERDT,
supra note 8 at 23; Peter Drucker, In the Tropics there is no Sin, 218 NEW LEFT REVIEW 76 (1996)
(observing that five hundred years before, many kinship-based structures in Africa and Americas had a
predominance of transgenderal homosexuality, whereas the Islamic West, Central Asia and North Africa
had a predominance of age and class-structured homosexual social organization).
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identity and conduct may be a profoundly inadequate means of obtaining
protection for the vast numbers of sexual minorities throughout the world.
In each context, I argue that the introduction of this substitutive model
clashes with preexisting social meanings of same-sex sexual conduct. In
Thailand, for example, although a similarly substitutive model of sexual
identity is swiftly emerging, the social meaning of homosexuality has been
traditionally associated with transgenderism (what I call a transformative
model of the relationship between identity and conduct). In contrast, in India,
public health activists claim that many individuals view the performance of
same-sex sexual conduct as totally separate from, rather than representative of,
their sexual identity (what I call an additive model of the relationship between
identity and conduct).1 7  Yet, rather than incorporating these different
variations of sexuality and sexual identity, the substitutive model actively
excludes them from its purview, both simplifying and ignoring their richness
and complexity.
The concluding section of this piece argues that the vast differences in the
social meaning of homosexuality across different cultures require a more
nuanced and thoughtful formulation of the public and private aspects of sexual
identity. Here, I argue that what is needed is an alternative paradigm to the
problematic assumptions upon which identity-based categories are based.
Consequently, instead of concentrating on sexual identity, I argue that legal
scholars in the West and elsewhere might benefit from exploring other
paradigms of equality which focus on sexual autonomy instead.
II. FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC
To understand the complexities of nascent lesbian and gay identity-based
movements worldwide, I first examine identity-based claims to lesbian and gay
civil rights in the United States, which provide the richest examination of the
stark dichotomy between protections based on identity from those based on
conduct. Although there are various municipalities which openly embrace gay
and lesbian citizens by providing protections based on sexual orientation, there
are still thirteen states which persist in prohibiting sodomy.' 8
This uniquely ironic contrast-between the presence of antidiscrimination
protections for gays and lesbians, along with the continued criminalization of
sodomy-is almost entirely attributable to the outcome of Bowers v.
Hardwick.19 As a result of the decision, I argue that activists chose to redefine
the legal meaning of homosexuality to focus on a public, collective sexual
17. See Tom Boellstorff, The Perfect Path: Gay Men, Marriage, Indonesia 5 GAY & LESBIAN Q.
475,490 (1999) (reaching this conclusion with respect to some men in Indonesia).
18. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/issues/record?record=l I (last visited May 20, 2002).
19. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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identity, rather than a type of private sexual behavior. The success of this
approach, however, depended upon sustaining a model of sexual orientation
that presumed that one's outward, expressive sexual identity-gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or heterosexual-was representative of one's preferred sexual
conduct. However, as I explain, this unyielding focus on identity-based
strategies excludes those who fall outside of such neatly demarcated categories;
and, as further sections will point out, faces some severe limitations when
placed in a cross-cultural context.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick: Towards Identity Based Protections
It is now fifteen years after Bowers v. Hardwick was handed down, and
20supporters of gay civil rights in America are still smarting from the injury.
The intricacies of the Hardwick decision have been explored elsewhere in
greater detail, particularly with astute reference to the history of privacy
jurisprudence from which the case emerged.21 For the purposes of this article, I
focus on Hardwick for its discursive effect in framing the legal goals of the
contemporary lesbian and gay rights movement after the decision was handed
down.
In 1960, 'sodomy' laws prohibiting oral or anal intercourse between men,
women and between a man and a woman existed in all fifty states and the
22District of Columbia. Although they were rarely enforced, they later became
instrumental in propagating other forms of sexual orientation discrimination in
the realm of employment, social services, or child custody, and in providing
legislators with the basis for refusing to enact legislation prohibiting
23discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
In 1961, Illinois became the first state to decriminalize sodomy by
adopting the Model Penal Code's recommendation that the law refrain from
regulating consensual private sexual behavior between two adults of the same
20. For an excellent summary of major gay civil rights litigation in the United States, see Patricia
Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1589-1640 (1993).
21. For a list of scholarship on the decision, see DAVID 1. GARROW, UBERTY AND SEXUALITY,
902-904 nn. 97-98 (1994). See also Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality and Political Values:
Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Michael
Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521
(1989); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 739-802 (1989); Kendall
Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1436-1516 (1992); Thomas B.
Stoddard, Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987).
22. ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (1995). These laws were
largely an outgrowth from the mid to late nineteenth century, which saw a marked increase in state and
cultural surveillance of sex acts in Britain. Ellen Ross & Rayna Rapp, Sex and Society, in THE
GENDER/SEXUALITY READER, 161 (Roger N, Lancaster & Micaela di Leonardo eds., 1997); Jeffrey
Weeks, The Construction of Homosexuality, in QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY 41, 44 (Steven Seidman
ed., 1996).
23. WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 20-21.
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sex. 24 Nearly half of the states followed suit.25 Yet, starting in the 1970s, as
Professor Nan Hunter has explained, a countertrend began, wherein states
amended their laws to specify that oral or anal sex was prohibited only between
26persons of the same sex. This trend toward specification, as opposed to
decriminalization, coincided with two important events in U.S. history: the
emergence of a contemporary lesbian and gay rights movement and the
simultaneous renewal of a movement for religious fundamentalism in
American politics.
27
The gay and lesbian movement, by this time, had achieved significant
recognition as a discrete subculture in America, propelling lesbians and gay
men to seek legal recognition of their right to engage in same-sex sexual
28conduct. Amidst this background, gay and lesbian rights activists looked to
the Supreme Court for redress; hoping that the Court would extend the right of
privacy to protect the rights of individuals to engage in same-sex sexual
activities. 29 Despite the lofty goals by which gay rights advocates originally
conceived of litigating Hardwick, its ascent to the nation's highest court "ran
headlong" into this emerging trend towards legislative specification of
homosexual activity-with disastrous results.30
The facts of the case are well-documented. An Atlanta police officer
entered Michael Hardwick's bedroom while he was engaged in oral sex with
another man and arrested him for violating a Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy.3' Although the prosecution was formally dropped, Hardwick chose
instead to challenge the constitutionality of the statute itself, arguing that it
violated his fundamental right to privacy.32
The Court answered with a stinging, and ultimately incoherent, response.
Its principal holding was that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental
24. See Nan Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 538 (1992); Richard
Green, The United States, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 145 (Donald J. West &
Richard Green eds., 1997).
25. Hunter, supra note 24, at 538-40.
26. Id. at 538-40.
27. Id. at 539.
28. Id.
29. WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 22-24. See also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Beyond Gay Rights
Litigation, 3 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 385, 392 (1997).
30. Hunter, supra note 24, at 540.
31. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
32. Interestingly, a married couple, John and Mary Doe, had originally joined in the litigation,
arguing that they desired to engage in sodomy but had been "chilled" and "deterred" by the statute.
Hunter, supra note 24, at 540. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the married couple for lack of
standing, holding instead that:
Hardwick's status as a homosexual adds special credence to his claim .... While a plaintiff
hoping only to challenge a statute might overestimate his or her willingness to risk actual
prosecution, a plaintiff who genuinely desires to engage in conduct regardless of its legal
status presents a court with a more plausible threat of future prosecution.
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1205 (11 th Cir. 1985). By dismissing the two plaintiffs, as Hunter
suggests, the Court was able to adjudicate the case solely with regard to consensual homosexual
sodomy. Hunter, supra note 24, at 541.
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"right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy," nor, alternatively, did it contain a
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 3 3  First, the Court
rejected the proposition that the right to privacy as outlined in its prior
jurisprudence on procreation, marriage, child rearing and education, and
abortion extended to homosexual sodomy.34 "We think it evident," Justice
White wrote, "that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other
has been demonstrated. 35
Second, the Court defined fundamental rights as "those fundamental
liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' 3 6 It then concluded
that it was "obvious" that neither formulation would extend to homosexuals to
engage in acts of consensual sodomy, principally because proscriptions against
homosexual conduct have "ancient roots" and were criminalized in nearly half
of the states at the time the opinion was written.37 Because the laws against
sodomy were based on "notions of morality," the Court then declined to
overturn the law due to its majoritarian origins.
Third, the opinion also declined to immunize the conduct based on the fact
that it took place entirely within the confines of Hardwick's home. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court admitted that homosexual conduct between
consenting adults was essentially a "victimless crime," but concluded that "it
would be difficult... to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while
leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
though they are committed in the home." 38  Finally, in a sharply worded
concurrence, Chief Justice Burger wrote to underscore his view that "there is
no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy,"
referencing "the history of Western civilization" and "Judeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards. 39
The effect of Hardwick on the ensuing legal strategies for gay and lesbian
equality cannot be underestimated.40 One commentator described the opinion
as an "utter rejection of the homosexual lifestyle;"'41 others feared that it would
mean the end of the movement for gay and lesbian civil rights and equality by
33. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
34. See id. at 190-91.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 191-92.
37. Id. at 193-94.
38. Id. at 195-96.
39. Id. at 196 (Burger concurring).
40. It also marked one of the rare times that a Supreme Court justice admitted to making a mistake.
See Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, THE NAT. L. J. 3 (Nov. 5, 1990); and JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 518-30 (1994).
41. WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 46.
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foreclosing the utilization of other fundamental rights.42 The decision, in all of
its unflattering comparisons of sodomy with incest and adultery, and its
attendant rejection of protective notions of privacy, unquestionably brought
forth a transformative moment in the future of civil rights for gays and lesbians
in America.
Initially following the decision, a series of lower court decisions favored
expansionist interpretations of Hardwick which precluded the use of other
43
constitutional rights to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination. As one
author explained, "the implication of Bowers v. Hardwick was effectively to tar
lesbians and gays, as a social group, as potential criminals -people whose very
basis for being seen as a group was their shared propensity for engaging in
sexual acts which the state could properly criminalize." 44 The most prominent
of these decisions was Padula v. Webster, handed down by the D.C. Circuit,
which interpreted Hardwick to foreclose the possibility of suspect classification
by equating criminality with homosexuality:
It would be quite anomalous.... to declare status defined by conduct
that states may conditionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny... If the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a
lower court to conclude that the state sponsored discrimination against
the class is invidious .... there can hardly be any more palpable
discrimination... than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.45
Other circuit courts, following similar rationales, denied constitutional
protections to individuals based on their verbal assertion of sexual desire for
members of the same sex under the military's ban against homosexuals.
Despite the total absence of proof of same-sex sexual conduct, courts found
that the public assertion of one's sexual orientation constituted sufficient proof
for exclusion from military service. For example, in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, the
Seventh Circuit rejected First Amendment protections for an army member
who had been denied re-enlistment based on her statement that she was a
lesbian, despite the lack of proof that she had ever engaged in sexual activity
with another woman. Although the court observed that the plaintiff was
"free... to say anything she pleases about homosexuality and about the
Army's policy .... to advocate that the Army change its stance .... to know
and talk to homosexuals .... [she] cannot declare herself to be a homosexual"
42. See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915, 919-920 (1989).
43. See High-Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), reh 'g
denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
44. NICHOLAS BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY
RIGHTS LAW 37 (1997).
45. 822 F.2d at 103.
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and remain enlisted because her admission "reasonably implies .... a 'desire'
to commit homosexual acts."4  It was the "act of identification," the Court
observed, the simple assertion of an "identity that makes her ineligible for
military service," rather than the "speaking of it aloud." 4
In such decisions, courts displayed an enthusiastic tendency to equate
expressions of sexual desire for members of the same sex with static notions of
homosexual identity.48 And, by reading Hardwick in a similarly expansive
fashion, courts also initially tended to equate this homosexual desire or identity
with the prohibited act of sodomy. As long as courts persisted in identifying
homosexual sodomy, now defined as a criminal, loathsome act after Hardwick,
as one of the key underpinnings of gay sexual identity, gay civil rights activists
were unlikely to garner any success in advancing the gay and lesbian civil
rights movement.
Given the disastrous import of these decisions after Hardwick, gay and
lesbian litigants were forced to explore alternative opportunities for
constitutional protection. Their strategies led them to seek a discursive
redefinition of homosexuality: as the next section explains, instead of
mentioning the presence of same-sex sexual desire or conduct, post-Hardwick
gay civil rights strategies focused almost exclusively on changing the social
and legal meaning of homosexuality to denote a public, seemingly fixed and
stable sexual identity of gay personhood.
46. 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar formulation in Pruitt v. Cheney, where it concluded
that an army member's statement that she was a lesbian in a newspaper without any evidence of same-
sex sexual activity demonstrated that she "was discharged not for the content of her speech, but for
being a homosexual', i.e. a person who 'desires to engage' in 'homosexual acts."' 963 F. 2d 1160, 1163
(9th Cir. 1992); Cf Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
plaintiff was discharged for being a bisexual person, not for writing about bisexuality).
48. This was not the first time courts displayed a historically enthusiastic tendency to equate a
homosexual identity with expressions of same-sex sexual desire or conduct. For example, in Boutilier v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), the Supreme Court characterized a
Canadian man as a "homosexual" and "afflicted with a psychopathic personality" under the 1952
Immigration Act because he admitted that he engaged in sexual activities with other men three or four
times per year before and after his entry into the United States. The Court, without hesitation, assumed
that performance of same-sex sexual activities three or four times a year amounted to "pathological
homosexuality" and "sexual perversion." Id. at 122.
In dissent, Justice Douglas drew a crucial distinction between Boutilier's "occasional acts,"
and the affliction of a "psychopathic personality," arguing that the plaintiffs activities were not a "way
of life." Id. at 125-30 (Douglas dissenting). Here, we see the emergence of a critical distinction
between conduct and identity, between sporadic sexual activity with members of the same sex, and a
"homosexual lifestyle." Notwithstanding Justice Douglas' incisive distinction, the Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion in Hardwick that it reached in Boutilier: that the performance of same-sex
sexual acts (or the tendency to engage in them) constitutes homosexuality, and therefore deserved
criminalization.
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B. From Conduct to Identity: The Substitutive Model
Despite the fact that Hardwick may have foreclosed constitutional
protections for same-sex sexual conduct, the visibility of gay and lesbian
identity-in politics and public life in the United States-has vastly increased
in the fifteen years after the case was handed down. Six hundred people were
arrested for protesting at the Supreme Court after Hardwick was announced,
one of the largest instances of civil disobedience ever at the Court.4 9 One paper
addressed to gay readers:
What can you do--alone? The answer is obvious. You're not alone,
and you can't afford to try to be. That closet door-never very secure
as protection-is even more dangerous now. You must come out, for
your own sake and for the sake of all of us.50
The author's call to arms is an ingenious reversal of Hardwick's incongruity:
rather than attaining protection through privacy, as Hardwick might have done
had it been decided differently, the author exhorts gay men and lesbians to
"come out" as both an act of resistance and protection. 1
As a result of the Hardwick decision, gay activists, understandably, turned
away from seeking protection based on conduct and privacy and instead sought
protections based on sexual orientation and identity.52  The success of this
approach, however, depended upon propagating a model of "gay personhood"
or "gay essentialism" which presumed the universality of a number of
principles involving sexuality, sexual orientation, and sexual identity. Even
though this model preexisted Hardwick's outcome, it took on even greater legal
importance after the decision-and, indeed, has today become a central fixture
of the globalization of gay sexual identity.53  Within this context, the
performance of same-sex sexual behavior, however slight or occasional, is
assumed to indicate a universal essence and meaning.5
4
49. See Hundreds Protest Supreme Court Sodomy Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1986, at A20;
Douglas Jehl, 600 Gay Rights Activists Arrested in Capital Protest, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1987, at 1.
50. See Philip Brockman, A Fine Day, 175 NEW YORK NATIVE 13 (August 25, 1986), quoted in
EVE SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990).
51. See Steven Seidman, Introduction to QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY, supra note 22, at 20.
("[llesbian and gay politics have often assumed that adopting an affirmative sexual identity is an
emancipatory personal and political act. Indeed the process of coming out or publicly declaring a
lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity has been considered the most authentic sexual political act.").
52. The decision also spawned a wealth of legal scholarship that overwhelmingly and deeply;
criticized the decision. See WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 31 (observing the publication of over fifty
articles on the decision, many highly critical).
53. There is a rich literature tracking the historical development of homosexual identity. See, e.g.,
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1, 43 (1981) (observing the transition from
same-sex sex acts to a discrete identity around 1870); JOHN D'EMILiO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS IN
GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY (1992); GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK:
GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD (1995).
54. See Carole S. Vance, Social Construction Theory: Problems in the History of Sexuality. SOCIAL




I define this model as "substitutive" because it implies a legal, as well as
personal, interchangeability between sexual conduct and sexual identity. First,
at its most basic level, proponents of this model presume that the gender of
one's object choice determines a person's sexual orientation.55 Second, the
model also presumes that a person's subjective sexual orientation comprises a
foundational and central aspect of a person's sexual identity. 6 Third, and most
significantly, this model also assumes the interchangeability (or "substitutive"
nature) of gay sexual identity, orientation, and conduct. As expert Richard
Troiden explains,
Homosexual identities are most fully realized, that is, brought into
concrete existence, in situations where self-identity, perceived identity,
and presented identity coincide-where an agreement exists between
who people think they are, who they claim they are, and how others
view them.57
This focus on personal expression and identity also takes on legal import in
gay civil rights. Because such cases often depend upon an identity that is not
immediately visible, as Nan Hunter has explained, the identity--gay, lesbian,
bisexual-must be expressed in order to become cognizable.58 Thus, since a
lesbian or gay identity cannot exist without representation, expression has
become a component of the very identity itself.5 9 Under this substitutive
relationship between identity, conduct, and expression, "coming out" is largely
viewed as an essential, political instrument to build a community instead of a
largely personal decision. °
55. "[W]e learn from our culture that the key determinant of sexual orientation is whether the
subject and object have the same or different physical sex." Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual
Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 207 (1998).
56. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BREAKING THE SILENCE 4 (1994) (observing that "sexual
orientation is a fundamental dimension of human identity") (quoted in Paul EeNam Park Hagland,
International Theory and LGBT Politics, 3 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 357, 385 (1997); ELLEN LEWIN &
WILLIAM L. LEAP, OUT IN THE FIELD 13 (1996) (noting the central importance of coming out or
revealing one's homosexuality to some segment of the social world).
57. See Richard Troiden, The Formation of Homosexual Identities, in Gilbert Herdt, ed., GAY AND
LESBIAN YOUTH 46 (1989).
58. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
REV. 1, 5 (2000).
59. Id. at 9. See also JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE at
2, 25 (1997) (observing that the process of recognizing an identity also creates and constitutes the
identity itself).
60. See Hunter, supra note 59, at 7 ("[tihe moment of affiliation, of realization of exclusion, is a
(perhaps the) moment of identity formation. It is the moment when identity's social meaning becomes
manifest to the individual in the matrix of community. It is part individual, part social; part viewpoint,
part status."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner 's Sex and
Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 373-74 (1992) ("Coming out involves
first, recognition that one's sexuality profoundly involves feelings toward people of the same gender,
and that these feelings are important to one's identity; second, knowledge that this self-recognition links
one to many others with similar feelings and identity; and third, acknowledgment to others of these
discoveries and conclusions about oneself."); HERDT, supra note 8, at xvi (observing that the "rituals of
'coming out,"' thus "paved the way for new conditions of selfhood: a new kind of social contract with
the self and gay community."); KATHYRN WOODWARD, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 25 (1997)
("Identity politics involve claiming one's identity as a member of an oppressed or marginalized group as
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This focus on the expressive, rather than constitutive, elements of a gay or
lesbian identity, both legally and culturally, builds upon changing the meaning
of homosexuality towards a public, collective social group identity, rather than
an activity.61 According to Joshua Gamson,
[L]esbians and gay men have made themselves an effective force in
the USA over the past several decades largely by giving themselves
what civil rights movements had: a public collective identity. Gay and
lesbian social movements have built a quasi-ethnicity, complete with
its own political and cultural institutions, festivals, neighborhoods,
even its own flag. Underlying that ethnicity is typically the notion that
what gays and lesbians share-the anchor of minority status and
minority rights claims-is the same fixed, natural essence, a self with
same-sex desires. The shared oppression, these movements have
forcefully claimed, is the denial of the freedoms and opportunities to
actualize this self. In this ethnic/essentialist politic, clear categories of
collective identity are necessary for successful resistance and political
62gain.
The "substitutive" model of gay sexual identity that emerged-a model
that assumes the interchangeability of sexual identity and conduct-also began
to play a powerful role in legal decisions, which further emphasized a growing
trend towards minority-based claims for civil rights and equality. By
exploiting the presumption that one's sexual orientation is a fixed and stable
marker of personhood (and defined by the sex of one's partner rather than a
63particular sexual activity), activists were eventually able to decenter the
disastrous import of Hardwick in American jurisprudence.
As a result, strategies for legal equality turned away from focusing on
sexual conduct (and a concurrent right to privacy), and towards sexual identity
(and a concurrent right to nondiscrimination). As Professor Patricia Cain has
observed:
... Hardwick has changed the course of gay rights litigation. In the
federal courts at least, litigators now avoid privacy arguments and
corresponding claims that sexual conduct is constitutionally protected.
a political point of departure and thus identity becomes a major factor in political mobilization."); and
Barry Dank, Coming Out in the Gay World, 34 PSYCHIATRY 60-77 (197 1).
61. See Steven Epstein, Gay and Lesbian Movements in the United States, in Adam, supra note 2,
at 30, 42-59 (tracking this development since the 1970s).
62. Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self Destruct?: A Queer Dilemma, 42 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 390-407 (1995), in QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY, supra note 22, at 395.
63. See Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign Fund in Support of Respondents at 29,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 ("Logically, what defines the class of homosexuals or heterosexuals is
not the act of engaging in oral or anal sex - since both homosexuals and heterosexuals engage in those
acts in large numbers. Rather what defines the class is the gender of one's partner.").
64. As Professor Nan Hunter explains:
Left without a privacy-based defense against criminalization of that conduct, advocates and
some judges argued that sexual orientation was first and foremost a status, not contingent on
conduct. This riddle-is homosexuality status or conduct-was purely an artifact of the
categories of legal doctrine and the outcome of a single case.
Nan Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality. 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695, 1717 (1993).
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The conduct/status distinction ... has now become the driving force in
shaping new constitutional challenges to discrimination against gays
and lesbians. Relying on the conduct/status distinction, gay men and
lesbians as plaintiffs have challenged governmental discrimination in
employment and other public spheres, always careful to separate
questions about what they do in private from who they are in public.
65
In the wake of Hardwick, activists also turned to legislative solutions,
presumably hoping that the enactment of legislative protections based on
sexual orientation could serve as imperfect stand-ins for constitutional
protection. These nondiscrimination protections have the benefit of not
specifying a particular class of individuals to be protected, meaning that
anyone-gay, straight, or bisexual--can be protected from discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.
On the other hand, however, such protections implicitly assume-if not
impose-a convergence between an individual's public or perceived identity,
sexual desire, and sexual orientation, and continue to emphasize the public
aspects of these three. 6 6 In this manner, such protections rely upon a presumed
clarity in the boundaries of sexual identity, and require individuals to be
capable of labeling themselves, and their subjective desires, in clearly marked
categories.
This assignation of identity is one that has remained largely unquestioned
in the discourse surrounding gay civil rights; one's sexual identity is taken to
67be a foundational, fixed, and stable expression of personhood. And courts
have responded to this shift, embracing an alternate conception of
homosexuality to Hardwick in which the class of homosexuals is defined by a
shared personality, rather than a sexual activity. 68 Indeed, the most successful
cases for gay rights have unerringly capitalized on expressions of gay
personhood, framed by reference to sexual orientation, in exploring other
fundamental rights affecting speech, assembly, association, or the right to
69participate in the political process.
The first case to successfully mark this transition is Watkins v. US. Anny,
which involved a challenge to the military's ban against homosexual
65. Cain, supra note 20, at 1617.
66. See Janet Halley, Misreading Sodomy: A Critique of the Classification of 'Homosexuals' in
Federal Equal Protection Law, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY
356 (Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1992); Hunter, supra note 64, at 1696 (observing that notions
of identity increasingly form the basis for gay and lesbian equality, merging status, conduct, and
viewpoint into a single whole).
67. See Hunter, supra note 64, at 1717; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737, 739-802 (1989); Halley, supra note 66, at 356; Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The
Limits of Social Constructionism, 93/94 SOCIALIST REVIEW 9 (1987), reprinted in SOCIAL
PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES, supra note 54, at 134, 138.
68. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 808 F.Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Steffan v. Cheney,
920 F.2d 74, 75 (D. C. Cir. 1990). See also Janet Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR
OF A QUEER PLANET 91 (Michael Warner, ed. 1993).
69. WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 49.
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enlistments. Here, the Ninth Circuit neatly distinguished the class defined in
Hardwick as "those who engage in homosexual sodomy," from the class in
Watkins, which was composed of "those with a homosexual orientation. 7°
The court distinguished Hardwick as a "conduct case" and Watkins as an
"orientation" case.7' Under this bifurcation of the two, the court found that
same-sex sexual orientation "has never been criminalized," and therefore the
Army's ban on homosexual service unlawfully excluded persons engaging in
"many forms of homosexual conduct other than sodomy such as kissing,
handholding, caressing, and hand-genital contact., 72  Here, by separating
prohibited sexual conduct from protected sexual identity, Watkins thus
signified the end of treating gays and lesbians as potential criminals, and
marked instead the beginning of recognizing them as a clear and definable class
of minorities.
In these developments, the boundaries of public and private give way to a
renewed emphasis on the public expression of one's sexual orientation, rather
than the private aspects of sexuality. This development is partly based on
increasing juridical protection of the expressive content of identifying oneself
as gay, of "coming out."' 7 3  For example, in High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, a court ruled that a refusal to grant a
security clearance based on membership in a gay organization violated the
plaintiff's First Amendment rights.74 Similarly, a court found that gay and
lesbian Roman Catholics were constitutionally protected in appearing on the
sidewalk before St. Patrick's Cathedral, and in organizing other parades and
festivities.75  In turn, federal circuit courts have required universities to
76officially recognize gay and lesbian organizations and their activities as well
as the expressive activities of gay or lesbian-identified individuals.77
As a result of the enormous visibility of gay-identified individuals in
public and political life, the notion of sodomy as an index of both conduct and
70. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
71. Id. at 716-18.
72. Id. at 725.
73. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592, 611
(Cal. 1979), codified in Cal. Labor Code § 1101 and 1102; Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 384-85
(D.R.I. 1980).
74. 668 F.Supp 1361, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). Judge
Henderson's opinion was reversed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit, which characterized homosexuality as
a function of behavior rather than an immutable characteristic worthy of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 573-
74.
75. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 606 (2nd Cir. 1986); Irish Lesbian & Gay Organization v.
Bratton, 882 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
76. Gay Alliance of Students v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 162, 165-67 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Lib v.
University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 852-57 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 638 P.2d 1116, 1122-23 (Okla. 1981); Student Services for Lesbians/Gays and Friends
v. Texas Tech Univ., 635 F. Supp. 776, 781-82 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
77. Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Students
Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1 st Cir. 1974).
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identity has virtually disappeared from recent federal jurisprudence. 78  For
example, in Romer v. Evans,79 even the United States Supreme Court focused
exclusively on discrimination based on status and identity rather than
Hardwick's permissive criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct. In that
case, the Court overturned Amendment 2, a Colorado amendment to the state
constitution that prohibited enactments of protections for gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court found
that Amendment 2's existence was motivated solely by animus towards a
particular group and therefore could not survive rational basis scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. "[Amendment 2] identifies persons by a single trait,"
the Court wrote, "and then denies them protection across the board."80 The
Court also concluded, failing to mention Hardwick, that Amendment 2 was a
"status based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we
could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause
does not permit."8' In this sentence, the Supreme Court focused exclusively on
the contours of gay personhood, demonstrating that the laws governing sexual
orientation are far more preoccupied with an identity-based definition of
homosexuality, rather than a conduct-based definition.82
Yet this transition-from conduct to identity, and from privacy rights to
antidiscrimination-represents an ironic and unsettling culmination of the gay
civil rights movement. Both culturally and legally, this seminal focus on
identity remains confusing and contradictory.83 Hardwick's legacy leaves gays
and lesbians in the rather ironic predicament of facing imprisonment for sexual
displays of affection in some states, although they have won the right to enjoy
formalized domestic partnerships, the right to adopt and raise children, the right
78. See Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified: Speculations on Law's Discourse, Race and the
Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF
LAW 65 (Didi Herman & Carl Stynchin eds., 1995).
79. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
80. Id. at 633.
81. Id. at 635.
82. Later cases that have come before the Court have continued this trend. While Hardwick
equated homosexual identity with conduct, Romer and its progeny have restricted their contemplations
of homosexuality entirely to questions of identity and visibility, rather than Hardwick's implications.
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). For excellent commentary on each case, see
CARL F. STYNCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL IDENTITY POLITICS AND
THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 45 (1998) and Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of
Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley, 49 STAN. L REV. 143 (1996). As
Janet Halley has noted, the Supreme Court has utterly failed to mention Hardwick, thereby leaving
unquestioned whether states enjoy the power to criminalize homosexual sodomy in Romer's wake. See
Janet Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429 (1997).
83. See WINTEMUTE, supra note 22, at 89 ("So long as Hardwick stands, analysis of sexual
orientation discrimination issues under the U.S. Constitution is doomed to incoherence."); and Cain,
supra note 20, at 1641.
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to serve quietly in the military, and the right to nondiscrimination in
employment in other places throughout the country.
8 4
At the same time, however, it is a virtual miracle and a testament to the
skill and power of civil rights activists that protections based on sexual
orientation even exist, given Hardwick's vituperative tone. Yet an optimistic
reading of cases like Watkins represent the best that gay rights activists can
hope for until Hardwick is overturned: a fragile kind of equality that is based
not on sexual privacy, but on a notion of personhood that emphasizes
protecting sexual identity rather than the act of sex itself, thereby permitting
identity-based protections to overshadow privacy-based protections.8 5 As the
following sections will describe, however, this redefinition has encountered its
fair share of challenges from both inside and outside of the United States.
C. Social Construction: Challenging the Substitutive Model
As I have suggested, the predominant gay civil rights movement in the
United States has displayed a yearning tendency to substitute a discernible
sexual orientation and identity for same-sex sexual conduct; and then to attach
a categorical imperative to "coming out." Just as gay and lesbian activists in
the United States have successfully sought to transform the social meaning of
homosexuality in a legal context, they have also asserted significant leadership
over the global constitution of that identity, exerting enormous power in
determining the manner by which individuals define their sexual identities.8 6
Gay pride parades have become a global phenomenon; and gay and lesbian
activists have made their way around the globe to assist the formation of
nascent movements. 
87
Yet this monopoly power over sexual self-definition can also be deeply
problematic. Categories of gay, lesbian, heterosexual, or bisexual identity, as a
basis for individual and collective identity, often obscure a deeper question of
whether such categories of sexual orientation can--or should-serve as
universal categories for everyone. Moreover, imposing a gay, lesbian, or
bisexual identity on individuals who may engage in same-sex sexual behavior,
84. For further information on each of these developments, see the web site of LAMBDA LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/record?record=l 8
(last visited May 20, 2002).
85. See Browning, supra note 4, at 23:
[F]rontline gay activists militate for the sacredness of the homosexual while dismissing...
the subject of sexual desire itself. Rather than press the society to enlarge and enrich its
sexual culture, they argue, agitate, and seek to legislate for the rights and interests of the gay
movement. Instead of sex, they demand sexual identity.
86. See supra note 4; DENNIS ALTMAN, GLOBAL SEX 75 (2001).
87. Id. See Dennis Altman, Global Gaze/Global Gays, 3 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 417, 421, 426 (1997)




but who do not fit a substitutive paradigm between identity and conduct, can be
unduly confining, exclusionary, and inappropriate.
These insights draw much of their power from the social construction
movement, which has flourished almost entirely outside of-and yet parallel
to--the global gay civil rights movement. In the last twenty years, even though
gay legal activists continued to focus on emphasizing the importance of
identity-based claims to gay civil rights, scholars in other fields-historians,
anthropologists, sociologists, and others-have actively deconstructed the
presumed equation between identity, desire, and sexual conduct that animates a
gay or lesbian sexual identity. For example, a proliferation of studies on the
social construction of identity have argued that gay personhood, or gay
essentialism, is utterly incapable of capturing an emerging divide between act
and identity.88 Many of these scholars are sympathetic to the work of Michel
Foucault,89 who critiqued the centrality of sexuality to personhood in Western
society. Under a social constructionist perspective, sexual acts, in and of
themselves, lack an inherent meaning. Rather, culture, society, and history
assign particular meanings to sexual behavior, desire and experiences.9" Thus,
social constructionists argue that notions of sexuality and sexual identity can
only be understood in terms of their sociohistorical and political contexts.
91
According to this view, the presumed substitutive relationship between
sexual acts and identity that characterizes gay personhood is instead a semiotic
conflation that obscures the growing complexities of sexuality, modernity, and
socialization. Since sexual acts carry different meanings in different cultural
and temporal contexts, it is largely impossible to universalize clear definitions
of identity, and the relationship between act and identity is not nearly as
92"fixed" as the model of gay personhood presupposes. Instead,
constructionists argue that sexual identity is rarely a matter of sexual practice,
and rarely a matter of the gender of one's object choice.9 3 Jeffrey Weeks, for
88. See Lenore Manderson & Margaret Jolly, Introduction to SITES OF DESIRE, ECONOMIES OF
PLEASURE 4-5 (Lenore Manderson & Margaret Jolly eds., 1997); Richard A. Parker & John Gagnon,
Introduction to CONCEIVING SEXUALITY II (Richard A. Parker & John H. Gagnon eds., 1995); SAME-
SEX RELATIONS AND FEMALE DESIRES: TRANSGENDER PRACTICES ACROSS CULTURES (Evelyn
Blackwood & Saskia E. Wieringa eds., 1999).
89. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, supra note 53, at 43 (observing the transformation from those who
performed sodomy to the "species" of the homosexual); Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity, in
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES, supra note 54, at 137.
90. See Epstein, id. See also JOHN GAGNON, HUMAN SEXUALITIES (1977).
91. See, e.g., Rosalind Morris, Three Genders and Four Sexualities, 2 POSITIONS 15, 17 (1994)
(following Foucault, arguing that sexuality and sexual identity in the West must be contextualized in
terms of capitalism, in which sexual relations are situated within a lens of commodity exchange,
consumption, and object choice).
92. See Vance, supra note 54, at 163 (discussing this view).
93. Morris, supra note 91, at 17. See also Dana Takagi, Maiden Voyage, in QUEER
THEORY/SOCIOLOGY, supra note 22, at 245:
A definition of sexualities is fraught with all sorts of definition conundrums, what exactly
does it mean, sexualities? The plurality of the term may be unsettling to some who recognize
three (or two, or one) forms of sexual identity: gay, straight, bisexual. But there are those
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example, argued that an important distinction must be made between
homosexual behavior (which is universal) and a homosexual identity (which
emerged only at the end of the nineteenth century).94 As explained eloquently
by Steven Epstein:
Where essentialism took for granted that all societies consist of people
who are either heterosexuals or homosexuals (with perhaps some
bisexuals), constructionists demonstrated that the notion of "the
homosexual" is a sociohistorical product, not universally applicable,
and worthy of explanation in its own right. And where essentialism
would treat the self-attribution of a "homosexual identity" as
unproblematic-as simply the conscious recognition of a true,
underlying "orientation"--constructionism focused attention on
identity as a complex development outcome, the consequence of an
interactive process of social labeling and self-identification.
95
In so doing, social constructionist insight echoed many observations made by
feminist legal and critical race scholars-that identities are always multiple,
96and intersected with other identity components.
Such perspectives brought to the table of gay civil rights an unyielding
commitment to reexamine-and openly challenge-the foundational categories
upon which much of the movement was based upon. As Joshua Gamson has
eloquently pointed out, the social constructionist movement, "shakes the
ground on which gay and lesbian politics have been built," by taking apart
concepts like "'sexual minority,' 'gay community,' indeed of 'gay' and
who identify as straight, but regularly engage in homoeroticism, and, of course, there are
those who claim the identity gay/lesbian, but engage in heterosexual sex. In addition, some
people identify themselves sexually but do not actually have sex, and, there are those who
claim celibacy as a sexual practice.
94. See generally JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUT (1977); SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
MEANINGS, MYTHS AND MODERN SEXUALITIES (1985).
95. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 138. Excellent examples of social constructionist work includes
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); KENNETH PLUMMER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
HOMOSEXUAL (981); DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988). See also
FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, supra note 68.
96. SEIDMAN, supra note 22, at 11. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal
Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Interconnectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 25
(1995). These scholars have illuminated the multiple dimensions of personhood by introducing
concepts such as multiplicity and intersectionality. Multiplicity has yielded the insight that "each
individual embodies multiple aspects of personhood like sex, gender, race, ethnicity, class and sexual
orientation at once, and that social experience is constructed from and shaded by the configuration of
those traits as a particularized sum that creates an individuated whole." Id. at 55. in contrast,
intersectionality highlights how law and public policy has failed to recognize the social and legal
significance of discrimination that is propagated along a person's multiple dimensions. Id. For
additional discussion, see Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Elvia Rosales
Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
103, 107 (1994); Jeffrey C. Mingo, More Colors than the Rainbow, 8 Law & Sex. 561 (1998); Julie A.




'lesbian' and even 'man' and 'woman."' 97 Instead of viewing homosexuality
as a natural, biologically driven, psychological condition, social
constructionists approached homosexuality as a social role, rather than a
discrete identity.98 "If we focus only on the 'subculture' of homosexuality, and
if we never interrogate the conditions which engender its marginalization, we
shall remain trapped within a theoretical framework which refuses to
acknowledge its own complicity in constructing its object (or subjects) of
study," one author, Ki Namaste, explained. 99
Such observations built upon important early work by Mary McIntosh,
who argued in the late 1960s that the category of "homosexual" was created
largely as a means to deflect contagion because homosexual practices are so
widespread. Instead of exploring the cause of homosexuality, she inquired
about the social conditions that produced the notion that homosexuality
constituted a distinctive, discrete human identity.' By singling out a
particular group as "homosexuals" on the basis of conflating act and identity,
she argued that the rest of society remains facially "pure" and unmarred by
sexual ambiguity. 10' McIntosh's work contributed an important insight: that
homosexuals are not born, but created in order to sustain a division between
gay and straight.
Following these insights, many scholars rejected the necessity of a natural,
essential, or universal gay identity to mobilize and to legitimate minority-based
claims to civil rights in the United States. Drawing on French poststructuralist
theorists like Jacques Lacan, various scholars and activists embraced an
alternative paradigm, labeled queer theory, that loosely referred to gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered individuals in terms of their resistance to
heteronormative structures, and to essentialist claims to identity itself.10 2 This
form of "anti-identity" politics argued powerfully against the idea that one's
identity or sexuality should be fixed, stable, or nameable. 103  Instead, queer
theorists noted that specific identity constructs are arbitrary, unstable, and
97. Gamson, supra note 62, at 395. As Annamarie Jagose has written in her insightful summary,
under this perspective, gay identity has become eviscerated "not only by the differences between
subjects but the irresolvable differences within each subject." ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY 83
(1996).
98. Steven Seidman, Introduction to QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY supra note 22, at 15.
99. Ki Namaste, The Politics of Inside/Out: Queer Theory, Poststructuralism, and a Sociological
Approach to Homosexuality, in QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY, supra note 22, at 194.
100. Seidrnan, supra note 98, at 14 (discussing McIntosh).
101. Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 17 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 262-70 (1968), reprinted in
QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY, supra note 22, at 33-40.
102. See generally SEDGWICK, supra note 50; JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1991); TERESA
DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF GENDER (1989); INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991);ALEXANDER DOTY, MAKING THINGS PERFECTLY QUEER (1993); SEIDMAN,
supra note 22, at 11. See also Gamson, supra note 62, at 591 (tracing emergence of queer politics to
1980s backlash against lesbians and gays, the AIDS crisis, and eruption of differences around race, sex,
and class).
103. Epstein, supra note 61, at 61.
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ultimately exclusionary. 10 4  Their function, it is thought, is to discipline,
regulate, and silence the multiplicity of different ways one can identify
oneself.1
0 5
Judith Butler, perhaps the most influential queer theorist of this period,
argued that gender categories were similarly problematic in her book Gender
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. In Gender Trouble, Butler
argued that there was no natural core or essential nature of gender categories,
that "gender" instead constituted a series of performative acts that, taken
together, created the appearance of an authentic "core" of gender identity. Gay
rights advocates, she argued, subverted many of the interests of their movement
by relying on clearly demarcated categories of gender, sex, or sexuality. A
commitment to such delineated categories, Butler argued, erases certain kinds
of identities-that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and those
in which the practices of desire do not follow from either sex or gender.1
0 6
Thus, instead of normalizing or essentializing same-sex sexual desires or
conduct, which is the traditional strategy of lesbian and gay rights activists,
Butler argued that gay rights advocates should seek to challenge, rather than
replicate, gender categories.
Others who embraced queer theory also pointed out that vast numbers of
individuals who engaged in same-sex sexual activity were routinely excluded
from the frameworks that ostensibly protected "sexual orientation" as a
category. 1 7  For example, bisexual and transgendered activists found a
welcome place at the table of queer theory--quite unlike their experiences
under the mainstream gay civil rights model, where their concerns were often
dismissed or alienated.'0 8
The rift between gay civil rights activists and queer theorists is startling
and compelling. While gay rights activists sought to use the language of
minoritization and sexual identity in order to protect gays and lesbians from
discrimination in the wake of Hardwick, queer theorists powerfully argued that
such categories were entirely arbitrary, simplistic, and assimilationist; and that
they failed to take into account the importance of challenging categorization
itself. Indeed, perhaps because of the polarization that such theories produced
between queer theorists and gay rights activists, queer theory has remained a
predominantly academic, rather than a legal, enterprise.
104. Seidman, supra note 98, at 11-12
105. Id. at 12.
106. See BUTLER at 17 (1990) (cited in JAGOSE, supra note 97, at 84). See also Katherine Frarke,
The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1 (1995).
107. See Takagi, supra note 93, at 225 ("For those who prefer a form of sexual identity that is, at
some point, at odds with their sexual practice or sexual desire, the idea of a single, permanent, or even
stable sexual identity is confining and inaccurate").
108. Epstein, supra note 61, at 61; Ki Namaste, The Politics of Inside/Out: Queer Theory,




Yet there has never been a better, or more important time to take account
of its insight-particularly where gay civil rights circles have emerged in
nearly every comer of the globe. Following many of the insights of queer
theory, one wonders whether the assumed conflation of act and identity in the
substitutive model utilized by gay rights circles translates as successfully in
other cultural contexts. For, as social constructionists have pointed out, there is
a space of deep complexity between sexual acts and sexual identities; the two
are not always as substitutive as legal categories might suggest. This
complexity forces us to be mindful of the legal limitations of exporting this
substitutive model to other contexts. As the following sections will argue, the
substitutive model is only one of a few different models of the relationship
between identity and conduct. Yet, the increasing globalization of the
substitutive model of gay identity has created complex fissures between legal
strategies towards gay and lesbian equality and social meanings of same-sex
sexual activity. Instead of embracing. these other variations of identity and
conduct, I argue that the global propagation of the substitutive model actively
excludes them from legal recognition.
III. THE GLOBALIZATION OF A GAY IDENTITY
Given the global visibility of gay and lesbian activists in the United States
and throughout the West, it is therefore somewhat unsurprising that
contemporary human rights discourse mirrors much of the preoccupation with
sexual identity that I have just described.'0 9 A host of human rights courts and
nongovernmental organizations have emphasized the seeming universality of
lesbian and gay identity."0 In 1994, for example, in a groundbreaking report
109. See, e.g.. Wayne Morgan, Queering International Human Rights Law in LAW AND SEXUALITY
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA, supra note 2, at 208-225, 216:
In the legal and academic texts which expound human rights law on sexuality, identity is
taken as a given. Each individual has a fixed identity which can be categorized according to
a set of logical terms whose meaning is relatively clear (gender, race, class, sexual
orientation and so on). These categories correspond to attributes of individuals which pre-
exist the labels attached to them. Pursuing legal strategies based upon human rights notions
means validating this theory of identity (at least, when such strategies are pursued without
analyzing their potential discursive effects).
For summaries of recent developments in human rights and sexual orientation, see Lawrence R. Helfer
and Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational
Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. L. J. 61 (1996); Note, Teetering on the Brink of Equality: Sexual
Orientation and International Constitutional Protection, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. (1997); and Eric
Heinze, Sexual Orientation and International Law: A Study in the Manufacture of Cross-Cultural
Sensitivity, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 283 (2001). For a critical view of these developments and their effects
on identity, see Martin F. Manalansan's excellent piece, In the Shadow of Stonewall, in THE POLITICS OF
CULTURE IN THE SHADOW OF CAPITAL 488 (Lowe ed., 1999).
110. For example, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, handed down in 1981, the European Court of
Human Rights found that criminalization of the act of sodomy violated a man's right to privacy and
equality under the European Convention. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). See also Norris v. Ireland,
142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993). The Court has also embraced
transgender equality by holding that discrimination on the basis of one's transgender status violates the
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on the international rights of lesbians and gay men entitled Breaking the
Silence, Amnesty International observed that
As a grass-roots, international human rights organization, Amnesty
International has a particular and useful role to play in locating gay
and lesbian rights in the consideration of human rights generally-not
as special rights, but as fundamental rights assured -to each and every
member of society. II'
The report goes on to declare that "sexual orientation is a fundamental
dimension of human identity."'' 2
Throughout the world, the strategic focus on "coming out" and the quest
for juridical protection of gay identity has taken on seemingly universalized
dimensions. 113  The rainbow flag has become the symbol of the global gay
rights movement-an emblem which tacitly suggests that homosexuality and
gay identity exists everywhere throughout the world, and in every cultural
community."l 4 As one anthropologist has written:
And over the years I discovered that, despite differences of dialect, the
language of gay men in places I have been is the same; we are one
tribe in diaspora, whether living in Trondheim or Zagreb, San Juan or
Oaxaca, San Francisco or Atlanta, Las Ve~gas, or Chicago. We are
indeed everywhere and in 
all walks of life.
The author, tellingly, observes that "[tihere are no boundaries, only untraversed
territories," a statement which suggests that the only factor differentiating gay
identity among men is geographical space, rather than psychological
difference. And it also, significantly, suggests that it is only a matter of time
international prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. Case C-I 3/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall
County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 (1996). However, the same court has also held that international
prohibitions against sex discrimination do not prohibit discrimination against same-sex couples. Case
C-249/96, Grant v. S.W.T, 1998 ECR 1-621 (1998).
111. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 56, at 385.
112. Id.
113. A recent book, THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS, documents nascent
civil rights movements in over sixteen countries, predicting that such movements are only the beginning
of a worldwide trend. Adam, supra note 2, at 1-2, 9. Instead of a predisposition towards same-sex
sexual conduct, a "gay" identity has become defined in terms of self-awareness and "a sense among
homosexuals of community, affinity, and common interest with other homosexuals globally." Roberts,
supra note 14, at 249. See also SEIDMAN, supra note 22, at 19. Seidman writes:
A key assumption of the sociology of homosexuality and gay politics has been the notion
that there is a common or more of less identical experience of being homosexual. For
example, some sociologists argue that because all homosexuals experience "the closet" and
"coming out" they share certain core experiences that form the basis of their identity. This
notion of a common sexual identity has been understood as the basis for community building
and politics.
Id.
114. For an excellent study on the globalization of sexual identifies, see generally DENNIS
ALTMAN, GLOBAL SEX, supra note 86.
115. Ralph Bolton, Coming Home, in OUT IN THE FIELD, supra note 56, at 153.
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before the author's notion of gay identity permeates every cultural milieu,
replicating itself throughout the globe.116
To some extent, the author's observations have come to pass, bringing
undeniably positive results for gay rights advocates.' 1 7 In 1994, in Toonen v.
Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee embraced principles of
sexual nondiscrimination when it invalidated the criminalization of sodomy in
Tasmania. In direct contrast to Hardwick, the court found that such laws
violated the male plaintiff's right to privacy and equality under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 8 And, in 1996, South
Africa became the first national constitution to bar discrimination based on
sexual orientation; two years later, it invalidated South Africa's sodomy laws
on the grounds that such laws violated constitutionally guaranteed rights to
dignity, privacy, and equality."19
Yet such positive developments are perhaps even more striking when
compared to some of the vociferous attacks launched against gay and lesbian-
identified citizens in other countries. For example, just recently, in a
sensational trial, an Egyptian court charged fifty-two men for engaging in
immoral acts or religious offenses, or, more formally, for "practicing
debauchery with men."' 2° And, in 1998, in India, a Hindu Nationalist party
launched a series of nationwide attacks against Fire, a film that depicted two
middle-class sisters-in-law falling in love with one another.121 It was the first
116. Id. See ALTMAN, supra note 86, at 93 (observing "those who take on gay identities often
aspire to be part of global culture in all its forms..
117. See ALTMAN, supra note 86, at 75:
Even while recognizing the diversity of sexualities, and the fact that for most people
behavior does not necessarily match neat categories, there is a gradual shift towards
conceptualizing sexuality as a central basis for identity in most parts of the world in which
HJV programs have played a significant role.
118. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992. (March 31, 1994).
119. See Heidi Joy Schmid, Decriminalization of Sodomy under South Africa's 1996 Constitution:
Implications for South African and US. Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 163 (2000), citing
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, CCT 11/98 (Const. Ct. Oct. 9,
1998). For an excellent discussion of law's constitutive effects in shaping social norms regarding
sodomy, see Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and
Social Panoptics, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 643 (2001).
120. See Neil MacFarquhar, Egypt Tries 52 Men Suspected of Being Gay, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
2001) at AI0. Two of the men were also charged with religious offenses, including falsely interpreting
the Koran, and exploiting Islam to promote deviant ideas. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL GAY AND
LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IGLHRC) Emergency Release Network Newsletter on Egypt at
http://www.iglhrc.org/news/press/pr_010703.htm (July 3, 2001).
121. See Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUSTICE 69 (2000); Gayatri Gopinath, On Fire, 4 GAY & LESBIAN Q. at 631 (1998);
Ratna Kapur, Cultural Politics of Fire, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (May 1999); Campaign for
Lesbian Rights in India (CALERI), Lesbian Emergence (August 1999). For news reports about the Fire
controversy, see Barry Bearak, A Lesbian Idyll, and the Movie Theaters Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1998, at A4; Controversial Film Incites Violence in India; 'FIRE' Burns up Extremist Faction with
Sexually Explicit Scenes, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 19, 1998; Soumitro Das, Fire In Our Belly- Suddenly,
THE STATESMAN, Dec. 15, 1998; Feminist Appeals India's Top Court to Allow Screenings of Lesbian
Film, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 7, 1998; Fire Explores Women's Dilemma in Modern World, THE
HINDU, Dec. 20, 1998; Fire on Trial, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU), Dec. 8, 1998 at Cl ; India OKs Film
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Indian film to "explicitly acknowledge the existence of lesbianism," as well as
compulsory marriage.22
As a result of the depiction of a sexual and emotional relationship between
married women, the film was attacked as a threat to family, marriage,
reproduction, nation, and religion. Tens of theatres were attacked by
fundamentalists throughout India, who broke display windows, ticket counters,
and burned posters advertising the film. 123  Critics of the film dismissed
lesbianism as "a pseudo-feminist trend from the West and no part of Indian
motherhood." 124  An editor from India Today agreed, expressing
disappointment that "the militant gay movement, which has hitherto operated
as website extensions of a disagreeable trend in the West, could come out into
the open and flaunt banners in Delhi suggesting that 'lesbianism is part of our
heritage. ,,125
Suddenly, the emergence of a public, collective, gay identity in some parts
of the world has become deeply fraught with accusations of cultural
inauthenticity and Western decadence. The clash of these different forces, I
argue, has produced a global-and cultural---crisis of sexual identity. This
section argues that the simultaneity of such developments-the globalizing of
gay rights discourse, and its attendant backlash-is striking, not just for its
temporal coincidence, but also for its entrenchment of the substitutive model of
sexual identity. 126
Despite marked differences in the social meaning of same-sex sexual
conduct across cultures, a substitutive model of identity and conduct has
become increasingly touted as the singular "cure-all" formula for gay
liberation. Yet that is a tragic and oversimplifying mistake. As anthropologist
Beth Povinelli has written, at the same time that many post-colonial nations are
facing the emergence of social movements whose political rhetoric and tactics
seem to mimic or reproduce Euro-American forms of sexual identity, such
movements have also posed significant challenges to the universalization of
About Lesbian Love, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 1999; Madhu Jain, Controversy: Ire over Fire, INDIA
TODAY, Dec. 21, 1998 at 78; Lesbians too Hot for India, Ian Mackinnon, Film's Followers Fight Fire
with Fire, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Dec. 9, 1998; Supreme Court Chides Film
Personalities, THE STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 1998; Supreme Court Disposes of Petition on 'Fire', THE
HINDU, Feb. 26, 2000; and Ashwini Sukthankar, For People Like Us, 328 NEW INTERNATIONALIST
MAG. (October 2000).
122. INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE CENTER FOR
WOMEN'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, WRITTEN OUT: How SEXUALITY IS USED TO ATTACK WOMEN'S
ORGANIZING 96-97 (2000). For more literature on same-sex love in India among women, see GITI
THADANI, SAKHIYANI (1996); ASHWINI SUKTHANKAR, FACING THE MIRROR: LESBIAN WRITING FROM
INDIA (1999); and also SAME SEX LOVE IN INDIA (Ruth Vanita & Saleem Kidwai, eds., 2000).
123. INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE CENTER FOR
WOMEN'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 122, at 96-97.
124. Id. at98.
125. Id.
126. See Manalansan, supra note 109, at 489.
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Western notions of desire, self, and identity-based rights.1 27 For this reason, it
is important for legal scholars to examine the insights that these emergent
movements yield regarding the limitations of a global gay rights movement.
As this section points out, these episodic clashes over gay rights further
demonstrate the danger that both opponents and proponents of global gay
rights have replicated the substitutive model of sexual identity. Yet the model,
as I have suggested, suffers from a critical flaw. Its presumed equation
between identity and conduct fails to recognize and incorporate different social
meanings for same-sex sexual practices. Moreover, it represents a peculiarly
stunted view of the complex relationship between identity and conduct, ignores
the need for privacy and autonomy, and runs. the risk of excluding many
individuals from concurrent models of constitutional protection. This Section,
therefore, examines the events of the Zimbabwean Book Fair in 1994, which
serve as a representative example of this recurrent phenomenon.
A. The Zimbabwean Book Fair
In 1995, the theme for the Zimbabwean Book Fair was headlined as
"Human Rights and Justice." Despite the idealistic proclamation in its title, the
fair gave rise to one of the most visible incidents of injustice against gays and
lesbians, and marked the transnational creation of a global gay and lesbian
rights movement.' 28 Just one week before the fair was to begin, the organizers
received a letter from the Zimbabwe Director of Information, which stated:
The government is dismayed and shocked by the decision of the Book
Fair Trustees to all of the so-called Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe
(GALZ) to participate in the Zimbabwe International Book Fair which
will be officially opened by the President of the Republic of
Zimbabwe, His Excellency Cde R.G. Mugabe. The Government
strongly objects to the presence of the GALZ stand at the Book Fair
which has the effect of giving acceptance and legitimacy to GALZ.129
While the government willingly acknowledged "the dynamic nature of
cultures," the letter emphasized that "both Zimbabwean society and
government do not accept the public display of homosexual literature and
127. Elizabeth A. Povinelli & George Chauncey, Thinking Sexuality Transnationally, 5 GAY &
LESBIAN Q. 439-50 (1999). Others have supported similar views. See, for example, Mark McLelland,
Male Homosexuality and Popular Culture in Modern Japan, 3 Intersections at
wwwsshe.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue3/mclelland2.html (January 2000) (challenging view that
Japanese homosexuality replicates Western models); Gayatri Gopinath, 3 RUNGH MAG., Notes on A
Queer South Asian Planet at 20 (observing that many non-Western sexualities do not mimic, but instead
rework and resignify Western models of gay identity); Lisa Rofel, Qualities of Desire, 5 GAY &
LESBIAN Q. 451-474 (1999) (observing the same with respect to Chinese gay identities).
128. Chris Dunton & Mai Palmberg, Human Rights and Homosexuality in Southern Africa, 19
CURRENT AFRICAN ISSUES 8 (June 1996).
129. Id. at9.
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material."'' 30 Finally, the letter concluded that the Trustees of the Book Fair
should not "force the values of gays and lesbians onto the Zimbabwean
culture."'' 3  Although the trustees asked GALZ to voluntarily drop out of the
Book Fair, it refused to do so, and the trustees decided instead to withdraw
their permission for GALZ to participate.
The Trustees' decision was marked by global protest. 32 In response to
such attacks, President Robert Mugabe publicly delivered a "stinging attack on
homosexuals."' 133 He defined the gay and lesbian movement in Zimbabwe as
persons who "believe [in] their alleged rights to have sex in public," and then
declared:
If we accept homosexuality as a right... what moral fibre shall our
society ever have to deny organised drug addicts, or even those given
to bestiality, the rights they might claim and allege they possess under
the rubrics of individual freedom and human rights, including the
freedom of the press to write, publish and publicise their literature on
them?
134
Mugabe then continued his attacks on sexual minorities, declaring that
homosexuals "behave worse than dogs and pigs,' 135 and stating that "if you see
people parading themselves as lesbians and gays, arrest them and hand them
over to the police."'136 One member of GALZ who had received substantial
publicity had his home burned to the ground, and was arrested twice in a single
day. 137
As a result of Mugabe's attacks, the world focused its attention on the
Book Fair. Amnesty International declared that Mugabe's remarks constituted
"a heavy handed attack upon the fundamental human right to freedom of
expression."'' 38  Seventy United States congressmen sent a letter to the
President, accusing him of bigotry and pointing out the South African's
Constitutional Clause supporting nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 39 In response, Mugabe declared, "Let the Americans keep their
sodomy, bestiality, stupid and foolish ways to themselves, out of
Zimbabwe .... Let them be gay in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere. They shall




133. Zimbabwe Leader Condemns Homosexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at A7.
134. Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 10.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id. at 14-15.
138. Id. at 11.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id. (omissions in the original). One parliamentarian observed:
What is at issue in cultural terms is a conflict of interest between the whole body, which is
the Zimbabwean community and part of that body represented by individuals or groups of
individuals-The whole body is far more important than any single dispensable part. When
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Swedish government also condemned the attacks, observing that Mugabe's
statements flatly contradicted covenants regarding human rights of which
Zimbabwe was a signatory. 141  And a group of British activists hounded
Mugabe when he visited Britain, attempting to undertake a citizen's arrest for
his statements.1
42
Since then, little has changed. In March 1998, before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, the Zimbabwe delegation refused to overturn or
repeal its sodomy enactments, citing the localized stigma that attached to
homosexuality in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the delegation observed that
homosexuality:
was not accepted by Zimbabwe's varied cultures, which had only been
introduced to the concept of human rights upon the attainment of
independence 18 years earlier. Legislative change was usually
effective only when it was culturally acceptable; to that end, much
remained to be done in the field of education.
143
In March of 2000, Mugabe identified sexual diversity with national economic
decline, and responded to Britain's stated concerns for gay civil rights by
charging that the British government is seeking to promote homosexuality!
44
Relations with Britain soured shortly thereafter. 145
B. Implications for Globalizing Gay Rights
Significantly, such incidents highlight a very important aspect of anti-gay
persecution: rather than persecuting sodomy (or same-sex sexual conduct)
specifically, antigay activists in the developing world often instead accuse gay
and lesbian citizens of falling victim to Westernization and foreign influence.
In this manner, instead of such debates being "new" or unique to gays and
your finger starts festering and becomes a danger to the body you cut it off-the
homosexuals are the festering finger.
Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 16.
142. See British Gay Rights Activist Offers to Talk with Mugabe, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov.
13, 1999; Gay Activist Charged for Threatening Zimbabwe President, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov.
16, 1999; Gay Slur by Mugabe Mars Blair's Visit; UK Government Branded 'Queer,' SCOTTISH DAILY
RECORD, Nov. 13, 1999 at 17; Dumisani Muleya, CIO Quizzed Over Gay Ambush of Mugabe in UK,
AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1999; No Trial in Attempted Citizen's Arrest of Zimbabwe Leader,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Dec. 10, 1999.
143. Phillips, in STYNCHIN & HERMAN, supra note 2, at 26 (citing text of report from UN Human
Rights Committee, 1998).
144. See Cosmas Nyamutamba, Zimbabwe: Gays and Lesbians Fight Entrenched Homophobia,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, December 2, 1999; Blair Hits Back at Mugabe, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE,
November 15, 1999. Eventually GALZ won the ability to participate in the Book Fair by winning a
court ruling allowing it to participate. See Gay Zimbabweans Win Fight to Open Booth at a Book Fair,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A4.
145. Somewhat ironically, as early as 1997, police were investigating charges of rape and sodomy
against Mugabe's mentor, Canaan Banana; he later stood trial for the commission of various acts of
sodomy. Stephen 0. Murray, Sexual Politics in Contemporary Southern Africa, in BOY-WIVES AND
FEMALE HUSBANDS, supra note 1, at 242-250.
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lesbians alone, they represent part of an age-old conflict between cultural
sovereignty, modernity, human rights, and tradition. 146 Lesbian and gay human
rights are often attacked as a "threatening imperialist import," not necessarily
because of the identities themselves, but because of their transnational
circulation. 
47
Second, as the Zimbabwe episode illustrates, anti-gay rights discourse
involves the framing of homosexuality as a "Western" threat, rather than a
question of individual rights. Under this paradigm, in stark contrast to the
perception of Western decadence, non-Western nations are depicted as "true"
placeholders of traditional culture and authenticity. 48 In this equation of "gay
identity" with "Westernization," gay civil rights then become a symbol of
recolonization. As one editorial published in Zimbabwe concluded:
Painful experience reminds us Zimbabweans and all other Africans on
the continent of moves orchestrated by colonialists to wipe out
anything that had to do with African culture constituted mainly by our
customs and traditions. This was done in ways that included the
imposition of foreign languages on our indigenous languages to try to
superimpose cultural values on our own values.
14 9
One women's group, for example, issued a supportive statement of Mugabe,
citing their position "as mothers and custodians of our heritage... [h]uman
rights should not be allowed to dehumanize us."1 50
In this manner, the debate over lesbian and gay rights in Zimbabwe
operates as a stage that tends to play out the conflict between "modem,"
seemingly Western valuesand traditional, "culturally authentic" ones. 51 Yet
the question posed by such events is whether a self-conscious, gay identity in
Zimbabwe can ever be considered to be indigenous or whether it will always be
viewed in terms that equate it with a Western export. For Mugabe's statements
suggest an implicit denial of citizenship: one cannot 'come out' as a lesbian or
gay individual in Zimbabwe and maintain a culturally authentic identity.
It is important to recognize, however, that sexual identity per se, not same-
sex sexual conduct, is the central target of such attacks. As Oliver Phillips, an
expert on Zimbabwe, explains, "[t]he vilification directed at gay men and
146. See Hoad, supra note 4 at 561.
147. Id.
148. Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 19.
149. Id. at 12.
150. Id. By using the rhetoric of sovereignty in conjunction with a commitment to "true" African
values, Mugabe scripted his role as a cultural purist and protector of moral values, standing steadfastly
in opposition to gay visibility as a symbol of increasing globalization. As one author argues, speaking
from an assumed position of cultural authenticity carried the secondary benefit of diverting the public's
attention away from serious economic and political problems. Oliver Phillips, Zimbabwean Law and the
White Man's Disease, 6 Soc. & LEGAL STUD., 471,484 (1997).
151. For example, as the Fair opened, one defender of the Board's handling of the issue explained,
"It must be remembered that it has taken many years for homosexuality to be accepted in the West. It is




lesbians in Zimbabwe recently is not the result of an increase in the
commission of or convictions for unnatural offences, so much as it is the result
of a growth in visibility for lesbians and gay men."' 52  In this manner,
Mugabe's anti-gay reaction must also be understood as part of an increasing
discomfort with visible assertions of sexuality.'53  For example, a
representative of the Catholic Commission for Human Rights in Zimbabwe
explained that "[g]ays and lesbians have the right to privacy but if they display
it (their sexuality) in public, it becomes public indecency."'' 5 4 Consequently,
there is a marked desire among anti-gay leadership to silence any public debate
on homosexuality, in order to prevent further experimentation.155
This conflation of homosexuality with tripartite perceptions of
Westernization, criminality, and modernization is a particularly difficult hurdle
for Zimbabwean gay rights advocates to overcome. Quite unlike the West, gay
and lesbian individuals in many non-Western contexts face an extreme
difficulty of overcoming accusations of Westernization. But even though the
debate is different, the result is largely the same. The essentializing view of
culture put forth by Mugabe was answered by gay rights advocates in equally
essentializing terms. In other words, Mugabe's repeated characterization of
homosexuality as a "white man's disease" propelled many black gay men and
lesbians to "come out" as acts of resistance to this perception. 56 According to
Oliver Phillips:
While previously, GALZ had found it difficult to negotiate many of
the social, economic, and racial barriers that exist so endemically in
Zimbabwe, homosexual men and women in Zimbabwe now found
themselves asserting a common identity regardless of their
backgrounds. Black men and women who identified themselves as
gay or lesbian 'came out' to insist that they did exist, making
themselves publicly visible on an unprecedented scale. Many
Zimbabwean same-sex lovers and transgendered people who had
previously not heard of GALZ or had not considered membership now
contacted and joined the organization.
57
152. Phillips, supra note 150, at 484. As his work has explained, common law in Zimbabwe has
proscribed "unnatural offences," which have been described as sodomy between two men, bestiality,
and a residual of other sexual.acts between men that does not amount to sodomy. Id. at 477. However,
while early years of colonialism reflected a predominance of convictions of black men; recent cases
between the mid-sixties and mid-nineties almost entirely involved white men as the offenders. Id. at
478. The increasing visibility of the convictions of white male offenders has thus contributed to the
perception of homosexuality as a white man's disease.
153. Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 18 ("questions of sexuality-of any kind-are not
often debated openly and frankly.").
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id. at 14.
156. See Phillips, supra note 150, at 485.
157. See Oliver Phillips, Zimbabwe, in RICHARD GREEN & DONALD J. WEST, SOCIOLEGAL
CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 53 (1997).
2002]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
By publicizing his homophobia, President Mugabe "has given an identity to
many who were previously ignorant of or uncaring about it."' 158 Here, contrary
to his efforts to contain the spread of gay identity, he actually played a
formative role in producing it.
Indeed, the constant assertion of homosexuality as a "foreign" influence
has only provided fuel for the diverse array of sexual minorities throughout
southern Africa to band together under a common, global platform. In this
process, both lesbians and gays implicitly utilized the substitutive model as an
interpretative tool to demonstrate the historical existence of homosexuality.'
5 9
For example, in response to statements by public leaders that homosexuality
does not exist in Africa, various groups uncovered research demonstrating
same-sex sexual conduct in various African cultural groups, and provided a list
of terms describing the expression of same-sex relationships and customs. 6 °
This historicizing project was directed towards confirming a gay and lesbian
existence in Africa by relabeling same-sex conduct in terms of a continuum of
gay or lesbian identity.' 61
In this manner, both neo-traditionalists like Mugabe, and gay rights
activists both set out to manufacture their own versions of tradition and
modernity. While Mugabe's cultural script actively excluded gays and lesbians
from its purview, activists sought to demonstrate that gays and lesbians had
been part of Zimbabwe's cultural fabric for generations by relabeling same-sex
sexual behavior and conduct as authentically African (and potentially
foundational evidence of a "gay" or "lesbian" identity). Yet such essentialisms
tended to replicate-and enforce-the substitutive model of sexual identity,
which equates same-sex sexual preferences and activity with the existence of a
discernible lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity. Like the United States, the
social meaning of homosexuality shifted in focus from "doing" homosexual
acts to "being" gay or lesbian persons.
As we have seen in the United States, a reliance on the substitutive model
in such contexts can be extraordinarily beneficial in terms of creating unity and
as a tool towards mobilization. Yet, this overreliance on substitutive models of
158. Phillips, supra note 2, at 31.
159. See Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 20; Jennifer H. Spruill, A Post with/out a Past?
Sexual Orientation and the Post Colonial 'Moment' in South Africa, in LAW AND SEXUALITY IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting one South African newsletter that declares that "there
have always been gay people in African society. They have not always been accepted, but they have
been there."); and Hoad, supra note 4, at 566 ("Activists ... have asserted the existence of a range of
precolonial sexual practices and 'traditions,' which could be called homosexual.").
160. Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 20.
161. See Spruill, supra note 159, at 13 ("This desire to find a pre-colonial gay self may be read as
specifying a historical identity by conflating conduct and identity."); and Marc Epprecht, Homosexual
'Crime' in Early Colonial Zimbabwe, in BOY-WIVES AND FEMALE HUSBANDS, supra note 1, at 198-99
("The obvious bigotry behind Zimbabwe's 'anti-homo' campaigns, as well as a wealth of new
scholarship from elsewhere in the region, demand a revisit to the history of homosexual practices among




gay sexual identity can also be deeply problematic for several reasons. First,
under this paradigm, a singular, unified and stable emanation of gay
personhood becomes touted as a universal global fixture. Regardless of
cultural context, sexual acts-and their seemingly corresponding identities-
are assumed to bear identical significance in global civil rights terms. 163  As
Martin Manasalan has aptly observed, those who ascribe to such models of
sexual identity often use terms like closet, homophobia, gay, and lesbian, as if
they were universally applicable to all types of behaviors, individuals, and
scenarios.164 Yet contrary to the prevailing assumption that individuals who
have sexual relations with members of the same gender are identified as
"homosexuals" or "bisexuals," there are numerous individuals (both in the
United States and elsewhere) who would never conceive of identifying as such
and yet who routinely engage in same-sex sexual activity. 65 As Gilbert Herdt
explains, "[tihey may regard themselves as 'heterosexuals,' 'straights,' or just
'human beings' who on occasion participate in homoerotic encounters for
various reasons, including pleasure, money, social expectations, and the
absence of other sexual opportunities."'
' 66
Second, these endeavors into the cultural production of a gay identity in
cross-cultural settings, regrettably, often fail to include the complexity of
potential meanings that attach to same-sex sexual activity, thus marginalizing
those individuals who fall outside of such substitutive paradigms. 167  As one
anthropologist has explained:
163. For example, a September 1994 issue of the GALZ Newsletter, is titled (in traditional gay
activist rhetoric) Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are!!. Emblazoned on the opening pages is a
photograph of two men bearing a sign that reads "Closets are for Clothes," and a poem by Liliane Lijn, a
British poet that declares:
out the you of yesterday
the leavings of yourself
the you that never was you
Id. at 3. The issue continues to exhort gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe to come out of the closet, and
includes a handy half-page guide entitled "How to Come Out." The issue states, in typical stridence:
It is long overdue that Zimbabwean gays and lesbians, like their brothers and sisters in
America, Europe, Australia [sic], and even across our Southern border, had the courage to
chant, "We're here, we're queer, get used to it!".... Now that's courage. And that's
political. Where is our pride? Where our courage? And where our dignity?
Id. at 12.
164. See Manalansan, supra note 109, at 489.
165. HERDT, supra note 8, at 4.
166. Id. See also Maura Reynolds, Kandahar's Lightly Veiled Homosexual Habits, L. A. TIMES
(April 4, 2002) at A5.
167. See Steven 0. Murray & Will Roscoe, Diversity and Identity: The Challenge of African
Homosexualities, in BOY-WIVES AND FEMALE HUSBANDS, supra note I at 267- 273 (recognizing the
presence of indigenous same-sex relationships among men and women that comprise particular
identities (such as age-structured relationships) that are analytically distinct from contemporary "gay"
identities). See also JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 46-47 (1998) (critiquing the
presumption that historical emanations of female masculinity simply represent "early forms of
lesbianism," arguing that such equations denies them their historical specificity and simplifies the
multiplicity of forms of same-sex desire); Manderson & Jolly in SITES OF DESIRE, ECONOMIES OF
PLEASURE, supra note 88, at 25 (citing more general problems in examining cross-cultural sexuality,
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The adoption of an identity, a process that may involve enormous
suffering and defiance, always implies the closing off of other options.
In this way, an identity gets a fixed character that, once adopted, does
not change easily, blurring even for the individuals themselves any
distinction between possible innate propensities (that, once expressed,
are labeled in certain ways), one's sexual behavior, and the social
category into which one has been slotted.
168
Under the substitutive model of sexual identity relied upon by contemporary
lesbian and gay activists, same-sex sexual behaviors that do not take on
explicitly "gay" or "lesbian" labels are dismissed as "unliberated," largely
because they fail to develop into individual political subjects. 169 Instead, they
are cast as "prepolitical," and "closeted," in stark contrast to the "liberated,"
"out," politicized, "modem" gay identity 70
Third, on a deeper level, proponents of the substitutive model often fail to
grapple with the important question of whether one's sexual orientation
universally-and necessarily-comprises a central aspect of personhood.'
71
Because people from different cultures may have different ideas about the
intersection between sexual desire, behavior, and identity, the very concept of a
gay and lesbian "community" may be open to question.
72
Gay civil rights advocates, traditionally, would argue that to demand
protection against harassment and discrimination based on one's sexual
identity, it is often necessary to openly acknowledge one's sexual orientation;
in other words, to perform the act of "naming oneself," that is, "coming out" as
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. 73 However, this prerequisite of "naming oneself," in
practice, translates into excluding large numbers of individuals who engage in
same-sex sexual conduct. The self-referential character of the substitutive
model of sexual identity thus lends itself to the perception (shared by many gay
rights activists) that a presumed equation between public sexual identity and
private sexual behavior is the only "proper" way to conceive of the relationship
between the two.
174
among them a "lingering imperialism" of scholars in judging sameness and difference from a Western
perspective).
168. See Blackwood & Wieringa, Introduction to SAME-SEX RELATIONS AND FEMALE DESIRES,
supra note 88, at 15.
169. Manalansan, supra note 109, at 486-87. See also Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 19
(observing that questions of sexual identity must be raised before addressing human rights).
170. Manalansan, supra note 109, at 486-87.
171. See LEwrN & LEAP, supra note 56, at 13 (observing that "the management of information
about our homosexuality is still a central theme in how we move around in the world.") (emphasis
added).
172. See Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 19.
173. Id at 20. See generally GALZ Newsletter, supra note 163 (espousing this view).
174. Yet, even if some individuals feel a strong need to perform this act of self-identification,
others feel an equally strong desire to resist labels and categorization. For example, some women in
Thailand actively resist using the term "lesbian" because the term entered the Thai language to describe
female homosexual pornography largely produced for the heterosexual male audience; and also is
thought to describe women-women relationships in overly sexualised, rather than emotional terms. See
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this model suffers from an
overwhelming predisposition in favor of visibility and politicization of sexual
identity, unwittingly privileging certain formations of identity over others.
17 5
For example, The Pink Book, a global study of gay and lesbian rights across the
world, has unequivocally observed that "the increased visibility of lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals, supported by a strong movement, has proved to be a
successful formula for confronting and fighting homophobic tendencies in all
types of society."
176
Yet, is this "formula" always translatable? 77 As I have argued, in stark
contrast to the substitutive models' presumed equation between identity and
conduct, many who engage in same-sex sexual conduct separate their sexual
identity from their sexual conduct. 178 As one study on African homosexuality
observes:
One comes across situations in which same-sex sexual intimacy is
tolerated and benevolently overlooked, as long as there is no risk it
will interfere with a heterosexual marriage and prevent the bearing and
raising of children. Same-sex intimacy is here tolerated, as long as it
remains unnamed, and as long as it does not exclude sexual acts with
members of the opposite sex.179
Graeme Storer, Performing Sexual Identity: Naming and Resisting 'Gayness' in Modern Thailand; 2
INTERSECTIONS 11 (1999), at http://www.sshe.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue2/storer.html.
Moreover, due to variances in language, the terms "lesbian" or "gay" may not be universally
translatable. For example, in June of 1995, a visiting American professor of psychology gave a talk at a
Bankgok university on homosexuality. His statement, "[s]ome women have sex with other women but
do not consider themselves as lesbians" was mistakenly translated with the word "man" replacing
"lesbian." After murmurings from the audience, and a discussion between the translator and speaker,
the sentence was retranslated with the English word 'lesbian' carried over into the Thai." Megan Sinott,
Masculinity and Tom Identity in Thailand, in LADY BOYS, TOM Boys, RENT BOYS, supra note 1, at
108. Apparently, as the author explained, the term 'lesbian' was an "untranslatable culturally specific
term." Yet by no means should one assume that there is an absence of lesbian relationships in Thailand;
rather, the terms used to describe such relationships are far more complex and subtle than the use of the
term "lesbian" to describe them. Id. at 108-116. For similar observations, see Evelyn Blackwood,
Falling in Love with An-Other Lesbian: Reflections on Identity in Fieldwork, in TABOO: SEX, IDENTITY,
AND EROTIC SUBJECTIVITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK 51-75 (Kulick and Willson, eds., 1995);
and Gayatri Gopinath, Homo-Economics: Queer Sexualities in a Transnational Frame, in BURNING
DOWN THE HOUSE II1 (Rosemary Marangoly George, ed., 1998).
175. See e.g., the GALZ Newsletter, supra note 163, at 11, which asks, albeit rhetorically, whether
it is "even possible" to be "gay without being political." Id. at 11.
176. Manalansan, supra note 109 at 490 (quoting from A. HENDRIKS, R. TIELMAN, & E. VAN DER
VEEN, THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN/GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 17
(1993)) (emphasis added).
177. See Chandan Reddy and Javid Syed, I Left My Country for This?!, TRIKONE MAG. at 8-9
(October 1999) (challenging "the general imperialistic rhetoric that suggests the West is the site of
liberation and freedom and that we come to the States to experience gay and lesbian liberation.").
178. SHIVANANDA KHAN, SHAKTI REPORT: KHUSH 29 (Naz Foundation 1993) ("[F]or many Asian
men, the term "gay" reflects their sexual activity, rather than the context that the term has in defining a
person. Lifestyle and sexual behavior is separated.").
179. Dunton & Palmberg, supra note 128, at 21. Instead of using the term "gay" or "lesbian," this
study recommends speaking about "men who love men" and "women who love women" in order to
include both individuals who have a sexual preference for members of their own sex, and those who
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Thus, what is being liberated, and what is being imprisoned-is not universally
applicable to different cultures and behaviors.1 80 Some cultures might target
gay identity instead of same-sex sexual conduct; and others might target
precisely the opposite.
The difference in targeting identity over conduct for moral and legal
opprobrium represents one of the most striking challenges faced by sexual
minorities in the non-Western world. Such differences carry enormous legal
implications for transnational gay civil rights, because they suggest that
preferencing identity-based rights in the absence of privacy-based rights-a
key function of the substitutive model in the United States-may ultimately
backfire in other contexts. For example, a recent case from Colombia involved
a law student and gay rights activist who was repeatedly kicked by school
guards who shouted anti-gay epithets as he waited inside a University
campus. 181 After his complaint against the University went unaddressed,
various letters of protest on his behalf were answered by the observation that
"exteriorization of sexual preference goes against the University principles and
will not be tolerated."'' 82 In other words, it was the assertion of the identity, the
act of naming oneself, or the "exteriorization" of sexual preference-that was
singularly objectionable, rather than the tendency or desire to engage in same-
sex sexual conduct. Although, as we have seen, there are certainly many
situations in the United States that reflects a similar targeting of identity over
conduct, sexual minorities elsewhere face an additional, crucial, burden: in
some places, an emergent gay identity is not attacked for its visibility alone, but
for its equation with "Westernization."
In sum, as further sections of this Article will elaborate, the predominant
equation of identity with conduct in the substitutive model is dangerous in that
it risks backlash in many parts of the globe; and exclusionary because it does
not offer protection to many who need it. Consequently, as this "modem"
invention takes root on a global scale, it is imperative that legal scholars
consider whether the substitutive model of sexual identity rests on a
particularly limited view of culture, identity, and the self. These differences in
both subjectivity and social meaning illuminate some potential limitations of an
identity-based global gay or lesbian rights movement.
1 83
may occasionally undertake same-sex sexual activity, but who do not consider themselves part of a
homosexual community. Id. at 20.
180. See Gilbert Herdt, Gay and Lesbian Youth, in SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN AND GAY
STUDIES, supra note 54, at 287.
181. See INTERNATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Emergency Response
Network Newsletter, Colombia: University Guards Abuse Student in Retaliation for Complaints, at
http://www.iglhrc.org/world/southamerica/colombia2001Jul.html (July 2, 2001).
182. Id.
183. See Dennis Altman, Political Sexualities: Meanings and Identities in the Time of AIDS, in
CONCEIVING SEXUALITY, supra note 88, at 101.
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IV. A 'TRANSFORMATIVE' MODEL: TRANSGENDERAL HOMOSEXUALITIES
There are a variety of types of same-sex sexual relations that fall outside of
the commonly used terms of heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual sexual
orientation. While transgendered persons are also quite visible in the United
States, anthropologists have also observed that, in many non-Western contexts,
the social meaning of homosexuality is actually defined by transgressions of
gender, instead of the tendency to engage in same-sex sexual conduct.'
8 4
Consider, for example, the taxonomy of the term "homosexual" in parts of
West Africa:
'Homosexual' is mainly used in describing a rather queer, feminine
man who likes to play the passive sexual role. Homosexuality itself
connotes transvestism and transsexuality. Although there are many
same-sex partners in West Africa, only a small portion of them will
identify themselves as homosexual. Sex between men is not
automatically labeled as homosexual behavior. 1
85
In this section, I argue that individuals who transgress male/female categories
and who engage in same-sex sexual activity transform the substitutive
relationship between identity and conduct that appears in legal discourse. In
other words, transgenderal homosexualities turn the notion of sexual
orientation on its head by demonstrating that the "class" of homosexuals or
heterosexuals is not defined by same-sex sexual conduct or sodomy (as
Hardwick suggests) or by the gender or sex of the chosen partner (as the
substitutive model suggests).
The destabilization of sexual categories does not simply illustrate the
difficulty of labeling; it has integral effects on social justice. As I have
suggested in the previous section, particularized terminologies, identities and
sensibilities are often lost in the global use of categories of gay or lesbian
identity.186 As Professor David Greenberg explains:
Homosexuality is not a conceptual category everywhere. To us, it
connotes symmetry between male-male and female-female
relationships ... When used to characterize individuals, it implies that
erotic attraction originates in a relatively stable, more or less exclusive
attribute of the individual. Usually it connotes an exclusive
orientation: the homosexual is not also heterosexual; the heterosexual
184. In this article, I use the terms "transgender" as an umbrella term to describe a wide range of
identities and experiences, including, but not limited to: pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative
transsexual people; male and female cross dressers (also referred to as "transvestites," "drag queens," or
"drag kings"); intersexed individuals (also known as hermaphrodites); and men and women, irrespective
of their sexual orientation, whose appearance or characteristics are perceived to be atypical. See
PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND
POLICYMAKERS 3 (National Center for Lesbian Rights 2000) and the more detailed definitions also
listed at note 194.
185. Roberts, supra note 14, at 247.
186. Shivananda Khan, Kothis, Gays, and (other) MSM, TRIKONE MAG., Oct. 2000, at 14.
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is not also homosexual. Most non-Western societies make few of
these assumptions. Distinctions of age, gender and social status loom
larger. The sexes are not necessarily conceived symmetrically.
187
In terms of law and legal strategy, I argue that the global influx of a gay-
identified, substitutive model of homosexuality actively runs the significant
risk of alienating other types of homosexualities from protection. As expert
Dennis Altman aptly observes, "modem" ways of being homosexual actually
threaten the position of "traditional" forms of homosexuality, especially those
centered around gender nonconformity and transvestism. 188
A. The Construction of the Transformative Model of Homosexuality
Gender-transgressive definitions of homosexuality, which some term
"transgendered" homosexuality is widely reported throughout parts of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, and represent perhaps the most overlooked and
fundamental variation in the different social meanings that surround
homosexuality across the world.1 9 Transgendered homosexualities are deemed
by some to be completely different than the substitutive identities explored in
Part 1.190 In contrast to age-structured sexual relations between men (examined
in the next section), which suggest widespread cultural acceptance of
homoeroticism, transgendered female identities tend to be stigmatized because
they are typically regarded as demasculinizing in character.' 91  Moreover,
contrary to the substitutive model, which is defined largely by the gender of
one's object choice, in a transgendered regime, a "homosexual identity" is not
defined by the sex of the preferred partner. Instead, one's homosexuality is
determined by the conflation of the sexual acts one is perceived to engage in
with a person's gender identity. 192 As David Greenberg explains:
187. DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 3 (1988)
188. ALTMAN, supra note 86, at 88.
189. See Drucker, supra note 16, at 77; Michael Tan, From Bakla to Gay, in CONCEIVING
SEXUALITY, supra note 88 at 92; Roy Chan, Ashok Row Kavi, Greg Carl, Shivananda Khan, Dede
Oetomo, Michael L. Tan, and Tim Brown, HIV and Men who Have Sex with Men: Perspectives from
Selected Asian Countries, in 12 AIDS JOURNAL (suppl. B) at S60-61. Similar phenomena have also
been reported throughout the world, including some Native American cultures through the persona of
the berdache. For a very insightful discussion of the berdache, see Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 'Sex,' 'Gender,' and 'Sexual Orientation' in
Euro-American Law and, Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995), and Mary Anne Case, Unpacking Package
Deals: Separate Spheres are Not the Answer, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1305 (1998). For more general
treatments of transgendered lives across the world, see GILBERT HERDT, THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER
(1993); and SERENA NANDA, GENDER DIVERSITY: CROSS-CULTURAL VARIATIONS (1999).
190. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 16, at 77; Michael L. Tan, From Bakla to Gay, in CONCEIVING
SEXUALITY, supra note 88, at 92.
191. See Peter Jackson, Kathoey><Gay><Man: The Historical Emergence of Gay Male Identity in
Thailand, in SITES OF DESIRE, ECONOMIES OF PLEASURE, supra note 88, at 184.
192. Amory, supra note 1, at 83. As Jan De Lind van Winjgaarden notes in his study of male Thai
sex workers:
in terms of traditional values it does not really matter whether a man's sex partner is another
male (which would stigmatise him as a 'homosexual' in the West). Instead, it is the sexual
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In the transgendered type, one of the parties abandons an original
gender identity. Usually the gender abandoned is male, but sometimes
it is a female. The gender-changer may be regarded as a member of
the opposite sex, or as an occupant of a 'third' gender role. Often they
take a sexual partner of the same anatomical sex, but this is not
invariably so. It is gender behavior and identity, not sexual
expression, that is critical in this classification scheme; our
highlighting this phenomenon as "transgenderal homosexuality"
reveals the priorities of a modem Western classification scheme not
shared by the peoples among whom this phenomenon is found.
193
Transgenderal homosexualities represent a crucial break with the
substitutive model of homosexuality presented in Part I. I call this model
"transformative" for three key reasons. First, in contrast to the West, where the
discourse surrounding gay rights has traditionally premised itself on
maintaining clear distinctions between types of genders and sexualities,
homosexuality in such contexts is equated with-and thus defined by-gender-
transgression. Put another way, in contrast to the substitutive model of gay
homosexuality where sexual identity is taken to be the visible expression of
one's preferred sexual behavior and desire, the transgenderal model suggests
that a third factor, one's gender identity, instead transforms the presumed
substitutive relationship between identity and conduct; demonstrating that a
transgender identity straddles-and transgresses-the difference between the
two. 194
act that a man performs with his sex partner that counts. That is, in terms of sexual behavior,
it does not matter much with whom one has sex, but rather what position one takes in
penetrative sex. This means that if a male sex worker wants to be seen as a 'real man' in his
social environment, he can do so by limiting his sexual script with clients to 'masculine' sex
acts, at least in his public accounts of his interactions with clients.
De Lind van Winjgaarden, Between Money, Morality, and Maculinity: Bar Based Male Sex Work in
Chiang Mai, in LADY BOYS, TOM Boys, RENT Boys, supra note 1, at 196.
193. David F. Greenberg, Transformations of Homosexuality-Based Classifications, in THE
GENDER/SEXUALrrY READER supra note 22, at 180. In contrast to the perceived "receptive"
transgendered individual, an "insertive" male is considered to be a heterosexual male. Chan, et. al.,
supra note 189, at S60-61.
194. It is important to define what is meant by the term "gender identity" and "transgenderism."
The term "transgenderism" refers to an activity or identity that "conflicts with established societal norms
of gender construction, such as transvestism and transsexualism." James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing
Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative
Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1007, 1050 n.1 (1997). Like Wilets, I utilize the same
definitions used by the San Francisco Human Rights Commission:
[T]he term 'transgender' is used as an umbrella term that includes male and female cross
dressers, transvestites, female and male impersonators, pre-operative and post-operative
transsexuals, and transsexuals who choose not to have genital reconstruction, and all persons
whose perceived gender or anatomic sex may conflict with their gender expression, such as
masculine-appearing women and feminine-appearing men.
Gender identity is the deeply felt knowledge of an individual that he or she is male or female;
in transgendered persons, the gender identity and anatomical sex may not be in alignment...
It is the expression of gender identity that results in discrimination because that expression is
perceived as conflicting with the expectations placed upon the individual solely because of
the form of his or her body, particularly the genitals.
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Second, as a related point, the social meaning of homosexuality in the
community at large reflects this transformation by equating homosexuality with
transgenderism, rather than same-sex sexual behavior. Thus (to generalize),
unlike gay-identified men who may usually choose other gay-identified men as
sexual partners, in a transgenderal regime, there are two kinds of individuals:
"heterosexually-identified men" and transgendered partners. This is partly
because a "homosexual identity" is defined by public transgressions of gender,
rather than the comparatively more private same-sex aspects of sexual
behavior. Indeed, the continued prevalence of this transformative model
throughout the world highlights that the distinction between gender identity and
sexual identity has little relevance for transgendered individuals who engage in
same-sex sexual behavior.1 95
Third, transgenderal homosexualities are deeply entrenched with cultures
of masculinity that carry a greater stigma attached to effeminacy rather than
same-sex sexual conduct. As Stephen Murray observes:
In their widely recognized womanly inferiority, the maricon and the
kathoey [both transgendered females] visibly reinforce gender
stratification. They perpetuate men's fear of appearing effeminate and
the equation between being sexually penetrated and being like a
woman in other ways. Those privately involved in receptive
homosexuality, but who maintain a masculine public appearance, are
obviously unwilling to forgo male privileges, and have a vested
interest in ensuring that the stigma remains on effeminacy rather than
homosexuality.
196
The following section discusses some of the implications raised by the
transformative, transgenderal models of homosexuality in terms of global civil
rights. As I will argue, the alleged irreconcilability of these two types of
homosexuality-one substitutive, one transformative-thus demonstrates the
need for a much more inclusive gay civil rights movement than has been
propagated by the substitutive model. In fact, the transformative model of the
relationship between identity and conduct illustrates how some groups may be
paradoxically excluded from needed protections.
B. Collision of the Substitutive and Transformative Models in Thailand
In recent years, the emergence of "gay" identified social movements across
the world has illustrated a hidden danger: the substitutive model upon which
the global gay identity is based actively excludes transgendered homosexuals
Id. (quoting JAMISON GREEN, INVESTIGATION INTO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDERED
PEOPLE, ch. 4 (SF Human Rights Comm'n, Sept. 1994)).
195. Peter Jackson and Gerard Sullivan, A Panoply of Roles: Sexual and Gender Diversity in
Contemporary Thailand, in LADY Boys, TOM BOYS, RENT BOYS, supra note 1, at 6.




from its purview. This situation has become especially apparent in places
where a gay-identified community has first emerged, and then collided with,
pre-existing transgendered meanings of homosexuality. For example,
Thailand's sexual identity system (which historically predated the arrival of
gay-identified sexualities) comprised three genders: male, female, and
kathoey.197 A kathoey originally referred to a "person, male or female, who
expressed hermaphroditic features or exhibited behavior considered
inappropriate for their sex, and [was] commonly called a 'third sex' within both
popular and academic discourses."' 9 8  Now, the term is used to refer to
biological males almost exclusively who exhibit feminine identities. 
199
Twenty five years ago, in Thailand, the social meaning of the term "gay"
was most likely to conjure up the image of a kathoey. °° Yet, today, the recent
emergence of masculine-identified gay men has transformed such preexisting
notions. As one author explains,
[i]n the 1990s, the Thai image of "gay" is increasingly masculine-
gym-enlarged biceps and pectoral muscles, accentuated body and
facial hair-and the Thai gay male is likely to confidently proclaim,
'I'm gay and I'm a man.
' 201
In contrast to a kathoey identity, the term "gay" denotes a masculine, gay-
identified homosexual man who ascribes to a substitutive model of sexual
identity, and is clearly and actively distinguished from transgender persons or
202kathoeys. As Peter Jackson, an expert on Thai homosexuality, explains:
The radical nature of Thai gayness is not that it breaks the old
sex/gender system but that it renders explicit what was previously
implicit, and transforms into an identity what was previously a
behavior. Thai gayness has emerged from within the traditional
sex/gender system and challenges that system by making public what
was previously private and by seeking general approval for the




197. Peter A. Jackson, Homosexual and Transgender Rights in Thailand (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). However, there is some evidence that a "gay" identity may have existed long
beforehand. In October 1965, the Thai press in Bangkok reported the existence of several hundred Thai
homosexual men who collectively belonged to "the gay association." Id. at 3.
198. Jackson, supra note 191, at 169. Thais now distinguish between "genuine kathoeys," or
hermaphrodites; and "artificial kathoeys," or males who exhibit cross-gender characteristics. In more
recent years, the term has also been used as a derogatory slur by heterosexuals to refer to homosexual
men, irrespective of whether or not they exhibit cross-gender behavior. Id. at 171.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 166.
201. Id.
202. Those who identify as "gay" also distinguish themselves from predominantly heterosexually-
identified men who may have sex with other men. The following section will discuss this identity as
well. Prudence Borthwick, HIV/AIDS Projects With and For Gay Men in Northern Thailand, in LADY
Boys, TOM Boys, RENT BOYS, supra note 1, at 62.
203. Jackson, supra note 191, at 187.
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Indeed, some argue that the term "gay" developed precisely as a mechanism to
disengage homosexuality from the label of kathoey and its feminine
connotations. 2°
This recent emergence of a gay or substitutive model of sexual identity in
Thailand has led some to suggest that it is a Western imposition on traditional
sexual and gender norms. Rosalind Morris suggests that this recent gay-
identified system of identification is a Western import that is largely
irreconcilable with the kathoey category. 205  While the latter category is
indigenous and premised on a tripartite system of gender relations; the former
category, Morris observes, is borrowed and premised on Western binary
206constructions of sexuality. And, in Thailand, the conventional, preexisting
idioms that determined sexual identity actually conflict with this "new"
sex/gender system which conflates sexual practice with sexual identity.207 "In
the earlier, but persisting regime," Morris writes, "gender identity was a matter
of social form, behavior, and comportment., 20 8 While it was assumed, and
generally required that men and women engage in sexual relations (kathoeys
were excluded from this requirement), "there was nothing to prohibit other
forms of erotic desire and experience."' 209 Under this traditional logic, Morris
writes that "virtually any act is acceptable if it neither injures another person
nor offends others through inappropriate self-disclosure., 210 In contrast, the
modern Western system, Morris writes, puts forth a notion of sexuality that
"dissolves the separation of private and public by bringing homoerotic desire
into the public domain as identity.",
21 1
The collision of the two systems in Thailand is a deeply instructive lesson
of the legal repercussions of failing to consider preexisting social meanings of
homosexuality. Most significantly, the emergence of this "gay" substitutive
model of sexual identity has contributed to increased alienation of the kathoey.
In other words, Thai gay men who subscribe to the substitutive, gay model
have attempted to shift the social stigma from homosexuality onto effeminacy
212by actively distancing themselves from gender-deviant kathoeys. As a more
acceptable," "modem" model of exclusive male homosexuality emerges, it has
204. Storer, supra note 174, at 8.
205. See Morris, supra note 91. Others disagree with Morris' formulation. For example, Graeme
Storer argues that Thai gay men draw as much on their own cultural traditions as those from the West in
forming gay identities. Storer, Rehearsing Gender and Sexuality in Modern Thailand: Masculinity and
Male-Male Sex Behaviors, in LADY Boys, TOM Boys, RENT BOYS, supra note 1, at 153 (pointing out
that it would be wrong to suggest that Thai gay identity is an 'importation from the West,' because such
perspectives deny Thai gay men agency in creating their own social and political conditions).
206. See Morris, supra note 91, at 19, 23 (observing that the radically different notions of body and
personhood that define Thai and Western sex/gender systems makes them culturally intranslatable).
207. Id. at 31.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 32.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Jackson, supra note 191, at 185.
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defined itself in opposition to transgendered persons, thereby labeling them as
the "' unacceptable' old face of homosexuality."
21 3
The increased stigmatization of kathoeys by gay-identified individuals
becomes even more striking when one considers the discrimination that
transgendered persons already face by virtue of their public persona. Contrary
to the "tolerance" which some might associate with the absence of sodomy
laws in Thailand, kathoeys face much greater social and legal sanctions against
their unconventional gender status than their masculine counterparts because
the kathoeys' deviance from gender norms is publicly visible.2 14 For example,
in stark contrast to the absence of laws prohibiting sodomy, Thai civil and
criminal law has failed to recognize sex changes, which means that post-
operative transsexuals are unable to change the sex listed on their official
records.215 In a 1981 decision, the Supreme Court of Thailand held that a male-
to-female transsexual was unable to change her legal sex status. The Court
held that a person's gender could only be decided by genetic and chromosomal
factors, and that the only definition of a woman would be "a person who can
deliver a baby.,
21 6
And, as the global gay rights movement takes hold in Thailand, the
military, police, and other state leaders have increasingly targeted
transgendered persons due to their visibility. For example, in December of
1996, the Rajabhat Institutes Council, which serves as the governing body for
all of Thailand's teacher training colleges, ruled that all "sexually deviant" and
C4 217wrong gendered" students would be prevented from enrolling in its courses.
This decision marked the first "legal" anti-homosexual ordinance since an
abolished law was passed in the early 1900s criminalizing acts "against human
nature." 218 Although it was unclear whether the Institute was targeting visible
homosexuals or transgendered persons (or both), evidence suggests that it was
213. See id. at 181. As one author observes, "like their 'straight' counterparts, Thai gay men now
define their identity in opposition to the effeminised kathoey." Storer, supra note 205, at 153.
214. Those who criticize kathoeys in Thailand commonly focus on four main points of perception:
gender-inappropriate-behavior, abnormal sexuality, social irresponsibility or selfishness for not
marrying, and the inherent suffering of leading such a life. Jackson, supra note 191, at 176.
215. Jackson, supra note 197, at 11. At times, the failure to reassign gender status has led to results
where male-to-female transsexuals have been incarcerated in men's prisons, where they have been raped
and subjected to sexual harassment. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Jackson, supra note 197, at 19.
218. Currently, Thailand has no laws prohibiting sodomy. However, this has not always been the
case. In the early 1890s, homosexuality and bestiality were jointly outlawed as being "against human
nature." The statute was introduced by a Thai king after visiting Europe, presumably to make Thailand
appear "modem" to the West. However, not a single prosecution under the statute ever took place and
the law was eventually abolished in the 1950s during a review of the criminal code. Jackson, supra note
197, at 10. Yet, despite the absence of legal sanction of homosexuality, some argue that "[c]oming out
is almost never considered to be a culturally appropriate option for Thai g/l/t/ people, except for
transgender and transsexual people whose gender transgression cannot be hidden." Jackson, supra note
191 at 177; and Jackson, supra note 197, at 12.
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the second, rather than the first.2 19 "Teachers must be 'role models' who pose
no threat of instilling sexual deviancy in young minds. Boys must be taught to
be men, and girls must be taught to be women,"' proponents of the ban
declared.22° In this sense, like the situation in Zimbabwe, the objectives of the
ruling involved limiting public discussions and visibility of homosexuality or
221gender transgression, rather than outlawing particular behaviors.
Despite the ban's eventual lack of success, the Thai government has
continued to single out transgendered individuals by enacting regulations to
exclude them from television programs and military service. For example, in
1997, the government exempted male-to-female transsexuals from a draft in
222order to avoid "turmoil" among the troops. And, in 1999, the government of
Thailand asked television networks to avoid broadcasting shows "that promote
sexual abnormalities" (referring specifically to transgendered persons) in order
to prevent "innocent youngsters from imitating unfavorable examples.,
223
As such examples suggest, transgendered persons may be subject to an
increased level of discrimination because they are often the most publicly
identifiable sexual minorities. But it is important to also compare how such
discrimination fares under traditional protections premised on sexual
orientation in the United States. Under the substitutive model typical of anti-
discrimination norms, transgendered individuals are excluded from protection
224from discrimination on the basis of both sex and sexual orientation. For
219. Jackson, supra note 197, at 20.
220. See Storer, supra note 174, at 4.
221. Eventually, the Commission on Justice and Human Rights in Thai Parliament decided that the
ban contravened basic human rights principles and decided against its institution. See Jackson, supra
note 197, at 21.
222. "Its not that we are resorting to discrimination," a Major General explained. "Those people
really belong in beauty parlors, movie studios or bars." See Rex Wockner, Thailand Exempts
Transsexuals from Draft, at http://www.wockner-news.com at #192 (December 29, 1997).
223. See Rex Wockner, Thai Gays, Trannies Protest, at http://www.wockner-news.com at #268
(June 14, 1999). Two months later, the Rajabhat Institute announced that male students will no longer
be permitted to dress as women. See Rex Wockner, Thai Male Students Must Wear Pants, at
http://www.wockner-news.com at #276 (August 9, 1999).
224. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why we Need to Include Transgender Rights in
The Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392 (2001). For example,
although Title VII and numerous state statutes protect employees against discrimination on account of
sex in employment, housing, credit, and education; courts have regularly excluded transgendered
persons from such protections. Similarly, although ten states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and Congress has considered the
Employment Non Discrimination Act, which would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, transsexuals and transgendered persons are completely unprotected. See Patricia A.
Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-Discrimination Law, 75 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1321, 1323, 1359 nn. 5-13 (listing cases and statutes); Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title
VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 283, 285-
286 (1997) (observing that transgendered persons enjoy no specific civil rights protections or any other
statute prohibiting sex discrimination, handicap/disability discrimination, or discrimination based on
sexual orientation.); Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories
and Law, 5 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 343 (1997); Note, Patriarchy is Such a Drag: The Strategic
Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1973 (1995); Susan Etta Keller,
Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
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example, courts in the United States have concluded that the types of
discrimination that transgendered individuals may experience cannot be
characterized as discrimination based on "sexual orientation" because such
discrimination is motivated by their non-sexual forms of expression.22' And,
using similar reasoning, courts have also concluded that transgendered persons
are discriminated against by virtue of their gender identities, not their sex.
22 6
Moreover, aside from the courts' exclusion of protections for transgendered
persons under the current models of "sex" and "sexual orientation," many gay
civil rights activists in the United States have chosen to actively exclude
protections based on gender identity in order to ensure a smooth passage for
227civil rights protections based on sexual orientation. In this manner, the
substitutive model again places itself in a hierarchical relationship to another,
alternative model of sexual identity. As I have explained, this relationship can
228translate into leaving one category protected at the cost of excluding another.
This exclusionary potential often extends past the United States. For
example, a case handed down by the Commission of Human Rights in the
Phillipines also exemplifies precisely the growing trend of alienating
transgendered persons from current models protecting sexual orientation. The
case involved a male-to-female transgender person who was barred from
entering the premises of a club on the grounds that she had failed to wear
"proper attire" for a male. 229 A gay rights organization presented a complaint
to the Commission, calling on them to investigate the case and take appropriate
measures. Yet rather than doing so, it dismissed the case on the following,
illuminating grounds:
In the instant case nobody can begrudge the complainant's sexual
preference or tendencies, nor his choice of clothes to wear. He has all
the rights to practice them, providing, in doing so, it may not violate
existing laws, rules, or regulations. In the privacy of his room, he
may, alone or together with others of similar persuasions, wear even
the most outrageous attire. But he cannot do it in a place like Club
Royale, which caters to clients belonging to the middle and upper class
REV. 329 (1999); Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the Civil
Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 1363, 1363-68 (1997); Terry S. Kogan,
Transexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom Labelled "Other, " 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997).
225. See Wilets, supra note 194, at 1007.
226. Several courts have reached this conclusion. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,
1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984) (construing "sex" to mean anatomical sex, instead of gender); Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (declining to extend protections of Title
VII to transgendered persons because such discrimination is not properly construed to fall under "sex").
227. See CuRRAH & MINTER, supra note 184, at 21-22, 51.
228. See id. at 51, discussing a popular fear shared by many GLB people that including transgender
protection will undermine efforts to secure civil rights for gay people.
229. See Commission and Court Send Mixed Messages on Transgender Rights, IGLHRC
Emergency Response Network, Phillipines (August 9, 2001), at
http://www.iglhrc.org/phillipines200lAug.html.
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markets. It is not farfetched that the sensibilities of other patrons may
be offended by a male customer wearing a woman's outfit. Club
Royale, engaged in a legitimate business endeavor, has all the
prerogative to adopt rules and regulations to ensure the protection and
satisfaction of customers. Adoption of a dress code falls under this
prerogative.
230
Later, the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights suggested
that the complainant would have only been granted relief if the Court had
chosen to formally change his status from male-to-female, as another Manila
court had done just recently."'
As the Commission's observations suggest, in the absence of explicit
protection of "gender expression" or "gender identity," a transgendered person
is usually interpreted to escape existing protections based on gender or sexual
orientation. As the Court aptly implied, protection of the latter does not
include the former, and vice versa. Thus, unless a transgendered person is
willing and able to adopt a formal status change-an option that is foreclosed
to most individuals-he or she will escape protections based on gender, sex,
and sexual orientation.
This lamentable situation, which has already played itself out in the United
States, can be readily replicated in Thailand and elsewhere, particularly since
so many kathoeys already face exclusion at the hands of "gay" identified
persons. Put more. directly, the social exclusion faced by transgendered
persons can have undeniable legal repercussions. A Thai gay man who
subscribes to a substitutive model of identity might seek identity-based
protections that focus on sexual orientation, whereas a kathoey might seek
protection based on gender identity instead. Yet both aims exclude each other:
the legal protections that might protect a kathoey from discrimination on the
basis of gender identity do not, under current models in the United States,
include protections based on sexual orientation or conduct; and conversely,
protections based on sexual orientation would leave out the principal manner in
which a kathoey faces discrimination. In sum, the transformative nature of the
transgendered identity, with its focus on transgressing both normative
categories of same-sex sexual conduct and gender identity, renders it
completely unprotected from discrimination under the substitutive model
promulgated in the discourse surrounding gay civil rights.
C. Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation in Global Civil Rights
The independent co-existence of gay-identified males and transgendered





model of sexual identity, and thus underlines the need to reimagine a new,
more inclusive model upon which gay rights discourse is based. As the Thai
experience suggests, activists in other countries should rightfully be wary of
importing the substitutive models of gay identity in their discourse on civil
rights, particularly since so many of the most visible homosexualities which
exist across the globe are transgendered in nature. Here, the protracted social
and political alienation of transgendered individuals suggests the need for a
more nuanced understanding of the profound inadequacies of a substitutive
model of gay liberation. In sum, the current state of affairs in Thailand-
"gays" on one side, kathoeys on the other-demonstrates that the language of
gay liberation may render some even more alienated than before.
These competing models of the relationship between identity and
conduct-one substitutive, one transformative-present us with a couple of
possibilities in terms of imagining how to protect each identity-gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered-from categorical exclusion. At present, the
governing discourses on law and civil rights present us with three choices: (1)
to enact protections on the basis of transgender identity as a separate category;
(2) to expand the definition of sexual orientation to include transgender
identity; or (3) to expand the definition of "gender" to include protection of
232transgendered individuals.
The first approach is most often used by gay rights activists who often
recognize the transformative nature of a transgendered sexual identity, and who
choose to include "transgendered" individuals within their list of sexual
minorities; or, alternatively, to include "gender identity," in addition to "sexual
orientation," in a list of protected categories.233 The United Nations, for
example, follows this approach, and chooses to address violations of civil
rights based on both "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" separately.
234
Proponents of this option also favor a separate category of protection to signify
that transgendered persons should be treated equally to other protected
categories, and that subsuming transgender identity under the purview of
gender or sexual orientation masks the unique difficulties faced by
transgendered persons.
235
232. See CuRYAH & MINTER, supra note 184, at 41.
233. The mandate of International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission is one example:
IGLHRC's mission is to monitor, document, and mobilize response to human rights
violations on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and HIV sero-status.
www.iglhrc.org/about/index.html (last visited May 19, 2002).
234. See Historic Progress: UN Officials Move to Address Human Rights Violations Based on
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, ACTION ALERT, at http://www.iglhrc.org/world/uscanada/
UnitedStates2001June.html (June 5,200 1).
235. As one transgender activist pointed out, if gender identity is subsumed under the protected
category of sexual orientation, most people will never realize that transgendered persons are protected,
and will continue to violate the law. However, one danger in utilizing this approach is that it can often
replicate unduly narrow requirements for protection based on gender identity. For example, a New
Orleans ordinance that aims to protect transgendered persons contains a four-part definition of gender
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On the other hand, treating the two types of discrimination separately also
suggests that they are distinguishable in expression and motivation. However,
some authors suggest that they may not be as causally distinct as the categories
suggest. Professor James Wilets, for example, has suggested that "to the extent
societies are uncomfortable with homosexuality, it is usually because that
activity is perceived as crossing gender, rather than sexual, boundaries. 23 6
Wilets argues that the oppression of sexual minorities in such contexts is
inextricably linked to rigid polarities of gender, which oppresses both women
and minorities in similar ways. 2 37 Thus, he argues that a society that broadens
its conception of appropriate gender roles will also embrace same-gendered
sexual behavior.238 Consequently, Wilets argues that feminism and gay social
movements share an important, and often overlooked, commonality of
challenging gender norms. For this reason, it is important to link anti-gay and
transgender discrimination in one corrective strategy, not merely because gay
rights activists usually sacrifice one in favor of the other, but because anti-gay
discrimination is often manifested by discomfort with both transgendered and
gay persons.
Consequently, the second approach, which is far more desirable, takes the
position that both homosexuality and gender transgression are integrally related
and need to be protected under a single category. This inclusive strategy
involves recognizing the particular visibility of those who are often targeted for
abuse. Consider the state of affairs in Thailand: since many men, women, and
transgendered people who engage in sexual conduct with one another do so in
private, and escape detection, the law restricts itself to interfering with public
conduct, rather than private behavior. This translates into a strategy that
restricts the expression of both publicly-identified gay and lesbian individuals
and those who are visibly transgendered. In such places, the law tends to
restrict itself to persecuting groups who visibly deviate from social, sexual, and
239
gender norms: namely, openly gay persons or transgendered entities.
Another example is Mexico, where although consensual homosexual acts have
been legal in private for more than a hundred years, and personal sexual
freedom is considered very important, the government has actively repressed
identification, and excludes cross-dressing from protection unless the person can document being
diagnosed with gender identity disorder. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 184, at 41-42.
236. Wilets, supra note 194, at 1005 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Gay groups locally and in Mexico City have taken strong stands against the murder,
persecution, and incarceration of transvestite prostitutes in Chiapas in 1995 and 1996. Juan Luis
Alvarez-Gayou Jurgenson, Mexico, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 24 at 93.
As one activist observed, "[tihe government has said it will not protect transvestites unless they are
dressed like men, insinuating that it is okay to kill homosexuals if they are visible." Anti-Queer Violence




public expressions of homosexuality by utilizing laws against public indecency
to prey upon visible homosexuals and transvestites.240
The Mexican and Thai examples suggest an important difference from the
Hardwick experience in the United States and compel us to re.-imagine a
strategy for gay civil rights that includes the transformative model of sexual
identity. Whereas the presence of sodomy laws pierce the realm of sexual
privacy between consenting adults; the absence of sodomy laws may create an
incentive for law enforcement to regulate public manifestations of sexuality
instead. Thus, one possible strategy towards ensuring protection for both
visibly gay and lesbian-identified individuals and transgendered minorities
requires broadening the definitional category of sexual orientation and identity
to include transgendered persons. This situationcan be illustrated domestically
with reference to the case of Geovanni Hemandez-Montiel, described by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States as a "gay [man] with [a]
female sexual identity" who applied for political asylum after escaping from
Mexico.241
Hemandez-Montiel realized that he was attracted to members of his
biological sex by the time he reached the age of eight, but he also began to
dress and behave as a girl by the time he was twelve. His behavior prompted
numerous reprimands from family, school authorities, and classmates, and
brutal harassment and sexual assault at the hands of Mexican police officers.242
Mexican officials arrested Geovanni twice, telling him that it was illegal for
men to dress as women and for homosexuals to walk down the street. 24 ' After a
failed attempt to escape to the United States, Geovanni returned home to
Mexico to live with his sister, who enrolled him in a program to "cure" his
sexual orientation and gender identity by altering his feminine appearance.244
After abandoning the program, Geovanni returned to the United States and
applied for asylum.245 The Ninth Circuit adopted the testimony offered by a
professor, who testified that certain types of homosexuals are subjected to
greater abuse than others:
... it is "accepted" that "in most of Latin America a male before he
marries may engage in homosexual acts as long as he performs the role
of the male." A male, however, who is perceived to assume the
240. Gayou Jurgenson, supra note 239, at 87-96, 89.
241. Although I would prefer to use the female pronoun, I will refer to Geovanni in male terms
because the court did so, notwithstanding the importance of recognizing her female gender identity.
Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). At one point, his school asked his
parents to consent to his expulsion, and then barred him from transferring elsewhere unless he agreed to
change his sexual orientation. A day after his expulsion, his parents threw him out of the house. Id. at
1088.
242. In one incident, he was forced to perform oral sex on a male officer; in the second, he was
raped while the officer held a gun to his temple. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1088.
245. Id. at 1089.
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stereotypical "female," i.e., passive role, in these sexual relationships
is "ostracized from the very beginning and is subject to persecution,
gay bashing as we would call it, and certainly police abuse."
246
For this reason, the court concluded that gay men with female sexual identities
comprise a separate society in Mexico, and are often blamed for present
economic and political problems.
247
Nevertheless, the lower court which heard Geovanni's case found that he
had failed to demonstrate persecution because he could choose to alter his
feminine appearance. The lower court viewed the manifestation of Geovanni's
sexual orientation as a volitional choice, rather than an immutable
characteristic of his personhood. It observed:
If he wears typical female clothing sometimes, and typical male
clothing other times, he cannot characterize his assumed female
persona as immutable or fundamental to his identity. The record
reflects that respondent's decision to dress as a women [sic] is
volitional, not immutable, and the fact that he sometimes dresses like a
typical man reflects that respondent himself may not view his dress as
being so fundamental to his identity that he should not have to change
it.248
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected this finding, and concluded
that the particular social group Geovanni belonged to comprised gay men with
female sexual identities. The court found both Geovanni's sexual orientation
and female sexual identity to be transformative in nature; i.e. "immutable
because it is inherent in his identity., 249 The court remarked that gender
identity and sexual orientation "are so fundamental to one's identity that a
person should not be required to abandon them.,
250
Significantly, the court used a hybrid of the substitutive and transformative
models by describing Geovanni, not as a transgendered person, but as a "gay
man with a female sexual identity." The court's unique response highlights the
possibility of redefining transgenderism to fall along a continuum of sexual
orientation, without conflating the two, and without excluding one in favor of
the other. Citing to various cases and texts that noted how fundamental sexual
orientation is to a person's sexual identity, the court observed that sexual
identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often
through dress and appearance. 25  Given the trauma which Geovanni faced
throughout his life, the court concluded that his "female sexual identity must be
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1090.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1093.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1094.
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fundamental, or he would not have suffered this persecution and would have
changed years ago. 252
Here, by focusing equally on the interior and exterior aspects of
Geovanni's personality (his "homosexual" sexual orientation and "female"
sexual identity, respectively), the Ninth Circuit's formulation ably transcended
the overly rigid equation between identity and conduct favored by the
substitutive model. It accomplished this by protecting both Geovanni's gay
subjectivity as well as his outward female appearance by concluding that
Geovanni manifested his sexual orientation by adopting gendered traits
253characteristically associated with women. By rejecting the lower court's
finding that he was not persecuted on account of his sexuality, the court
observed that Geovanni's effeminate dress and sexual orientation could not be
classified as volitional behavior, observing, "[t]his case is about sexual identity,
not fashion.,
254
In this manner, the court broadly construed sexual orientation to include
transgendered identification, drawing a key linkage between harassment based
on transgender appearance and harassment based on sexual orientation. The
opinion's conflation of the two is actually a protective move that captures
protections for both sexual orientation and transgender identity through a single
theory. It represents a milestone in ensuring protections for transgendered
individuals and other sexual minorities because it unquestionably broadens the
category of sexual orientation to include transgenderism. This linkage
represents a complete break with many other cases in the United States which
have refrained from protecting transsexuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation or on the basis of gender. In sum, by observing that one's gender
characteristics can comprise an outward manifestation of one's sexual
orientation, the court ensures protection for both transgendered and gay-
identified sexual minorities.
Hernandez-Montiel is also significant because it transcends the exclusions
of the substitutive model by recognizing the cultural differences that
distinguish transgendered from both self-identified gay and heterosexual
individuals who engage in same-sex sexual conduct. While the opinion
admirably refrains from imposing a "gay" sexual identity on all three groups, it
ensures that all three receive protections on the basis of sexual orientation. In
sum, by broadening the category of "sexual orientation" to include
transgendered individuals, who are thought to manifest their homosexuality by
virtue of the adoption of female characteristics, the Ninth Circuit demonstrates
252. Id. at 1095.
253. Id. at 1096.
254. Id.
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precisely the direction that identity-based claims to gay and lesbian civil rights
must take if they are to be inclusive.255
V. HOMOSEXUALITY WITHOUT IDENTITY: 'RITUALIZED' AND 'ADDITIVE'
MODELS
Transgendered persons are not the only alternative configurations of
identity and conduct that are excluded by the substitutive model. This section
will introduce two other alternative formulations of the relationship between
identity and conduct, which I call "ritualized" and "additive" models,
respectively. In the "ritualized" model of homosexuality, the performance of
same-sex sexual behavior is required as a formal rite of passage for men
256passing into adulthood. Here, no particular name or identity attaches to such
male homoeroticism; instead, it is considered an appropriate, even integral,
aspect of male social development.
257
Ritualized homosexuality conclusively demonstrates that legal definitions
of sexual orientation are extraordinarily context-specific. Contrary to the
perception that one's "gay" or "lesbian" sexual orientation is defined by a
predisposition towards sexual activity with members of a particular sex, some
cultures may view same-sex sexual behavior as a normal part of social
development rather than an identity-based phenomenon. Such differences
force us to recognize, following the insights yielded by social construction, that
same-sex sexual behavior does not always relate to sexual desire, sexual
orientation, or sexual identity and underscores the point that a community can
have different social meanings for such behavior. Yet all too often, these
important examples are cast as "archaeological artifacts" or anthropological
differences rather than crucial legal considerations.
However, such cultural differences undoubtedly translate into the social
meanings that surround homosexuality, and, at the very least, bear some
255. Finally, aside from seeking a possible hybrid of the substitutive and transformative models
suggested by the Hernandez-Montiel case, a third option involves redefining definitions of gender to
include transgender identity. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 184, at 41. Here, courts and
lawmakers might choose to define gender stereotyping as a kind of sex discrimination. However,
because the success of this method depends principally upon the existing jurisprudence on gender and
sex within each individual country, it is beyond the scope of this Article. In the absence of well-defined
protections for women (or men) against gender and sexual stereotyping, the Hernandez-Montiel option
of defining sexual orientation to include the transformative model of sexual identity appears to be the
most suitable manner to ensure that the transformative model of sexual identity is accorded equal
protection to the substitutive model.
256. Age-stratified homosexuality has been noted throughout literature and history in various
cultures. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek
Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1994) (observing the presence of age-
structured sexuality among men in ancient Greece).
257. Today, there are tribes in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea which have
institutionalized male initiation rites. See Chan, et. al., supra note 189, at S60.
258. Manalansan, supra note 109, at 488.
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importance for the future of globalizing gay civil rights. In the second main
section, in order to highlight the legal ramifications of such differences, I
discuss how the public health movements against categories of sexual identity
in India aptly demonstrates the limited relevance of the post-Hardwick
paradigm of identity politics. Compared to the gay civil rights movements that
we have seen, which tends to reify and polarize essentialisms in sexual identity,
culture, and gender, the public health movement in India has emphasized the
importance of creating a movement that transcends these categories.
A. Ritualized Homosexuality: Age-Structured Relations Between Men
In 1974, Gilbert Herdt, a classically-trained anthropologist, set off for New
Guinea to live among Sambian warriors and to perform research on the
existence of sexual activity among men there.259 When he first arrived, Herdt
recalled that asking his new Sambian contacts about homosexuality or male-
male sexual behavior typically brought about outright denial, laughter, or
puzzlement. 260 Yet months later, Herdt observed a series of secret Sambian
rituals in which boys were "inseminated" by slightly older men, involving the
placement of semen on or in a younger male.26' The boy-insemination ritual is
used in Sambia to separate boys from their mothers and to develop strength and
masculinity.
262
Age-structured models of ritualized homosexuality challenge traditional
perceptions of sexual identity and desire in both culture and law. 263 First, at its
most basic level, such rituals demonstrate the possibility that other cultures
may completely lack a concept of homosexuality as a sexual identity or a type
of person, and yet routinely engage in same-sex sexual practices. 264 Second,
such patterns also challenge the very definition of homosexual identity as
deviant or abnormal, reminding us that homosexual relations do not always
take on a social meaning that is external to preexisting organizations of gender,
kinship and economy. Indeed, as Herdt observes, in Sambia, "to be 'normal
and natural' [male] is to be inseminated by another man and then to take the
role of inseminator, first to a boy, and then to a woman, at a later stage
following marriage.,
265
Third, as Herdt explains, boy-insemination rituals challenge the very
essence upon which sexual desire (and therefore sexual identity) is placed. As
Herdt asks,
259. HERDT, supra note 8, at xi.
260. Id.
261. Id. at xii.
262. Id. at 13,115.
263. For an insightful discussion of Herdt's work, see Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work,
75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139 (1998).
264. HERDT, supra note 8, at xiii, xiv.
265. HERDT, supra note 8 at xiii.
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[d]oes the Sambia boy desire sexual intercourse with the older male?
Is the older male sexually attracted to the boy? Indeed, what does
'erotic' or 'sexual' mean in this context, and is 'desire' the proper
concept with which to gauge the ontology? Or do other factors, such
as power or kinship, produce the sexual attraction and excitement
(conscious or unconscious) necessary to produce arousal and uphold
the tradition?
266
Patterns of age structured homosexual relations therefore challenge deeply held
notions of the origin and function of sexual desire and eroticism among male
relationships.2 67 Rather than sexual activity existing as a function of sexual
desire, ritualized homosexuality suggests that such activities can exist as a
function of culture and tradition. In sum, Herdt's work also demonstrates a
point that is virtually ignored within legal frameworks governing sexual
orientation: that sexual identity can be entirely divorced from sexual activity.
In Sambia, sexual activity between males is considered an acceptable, even
integral ritual, but the very notion of a sexual identity based on such same-sex
sexual behavior is ultimately considered incomprehensible. Herdt comments
that he "had reached the limits of cross-cultural understanding" when he tried
to translate the word or notion of "gay., 268 For this reason, Herdt refrained
from labeling individuals who prefer sexual activity with other males as
homosexuals, explaining that in the absence of "homosexual" or "gay"l
categories of identity, it would be ethnocentric to project these meanings onto
such behavior.
269
In contrast to dominant perceptions of sexual orientation and identity,
neither partner is considered to be a distinct type of person in Sambia; rather,
the practice of same-sex sexual relations among men is considered to be
universal and mandatory. This represents a radical shift from the presumed
substitutive relationship between the two that figures prominently in legal
discourse and highlights the necessity for recognizing cultural variations in the
social meaning of homosexuality.
Why is a study of this model worth exploring in contexts that are so
obviously different than the conditions in the United States and elsewhere
throughout the world? The answer is very simple. Such experiences highlight
the continuing danger associated with universalizing categories of sexual
orientation that attempt to equate same-sex behavior with certain types of
identity. As Part I has suggested, a substitutive relationship between identity
and conduct is usually considered to be the preferred trajectory of gay sexual
266. Id. at 122.
267. While Herdt reports the existence of emotional intimacy among men, he observes that its form
is entirely different from the traditional 'couple' form that Western models often create. See id.
268. HERDT, supra note 8, at xiii (observing that "[Sambian] society did not have a concept for
homosexual or gay, and these notions, when I translated them in the appropriate way, were alien and
unmanageable.").
269. Id. at5, 122.
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identity. However, it is important to recognize that this formulation may not
translate as successfully in other cultural contexts.
This situation has both positive and negative consequences for individuals
who prefer members of the same sex. Speaking from a gay civil rights
perspective, it is obviously a good thing that individuals who engage in same-
sex sexual behavior are not stigmatized as deviants. The absence of a stigma
attached to same-sex sexual activity thus suggests the accompanying absence
of legal prohibition of same-sex sexual activity.
However, if homosexuality is not considered 'deviant,' but instead is
considered a normal part of male social behavior and development, then an
identity that is based on one's homosexuality is an identity without a
distinguishing substance. Here, the preclusion of a gay identity-and a gay
community-has real, potentially negative, consequences. Because the social
meaning of sexual activity among men is connected to--rather than separated
by-the institutions of masculinity and marriage, an independent gay existence
is thought to be incomprehensible in Sambia.
In practical terms, this means that individuals who do exclusively prefer
members of the same-sex are prohibited from developing an identity and
community with others who share this preference. For example, Herdt
interviewed one man, Kalutwo, who revealed a history of broken, childless
marriages and an exclusive attraction to males throughout his interviews. In
another cultural context, Herdt comments that Kalutwo might have been
viewed as a "gay" man:
In a society that had a homosexual role, Kalutwo might have found
more social support or comfort and perhaps might have been able to
make a different transition into middle age. But his village still
accepts him, and he has not been turned away or destroyed-as might
270have occurred in another time had he lived in -a Western country.
As this anecdote explains, the compulsory nature of marriage and
procreation makes it virtually impossible for individuals who are exclusively
attracted to members of the same sex to form a lifestyle, identity, or concept of
personhood based on this preference in Sambia. In other words, same-sex
sexual conduct in Sambia is not considered part of a "gay" identity; thus, the
"coming out" paradigm, cast as a function of one's sexual orientation and
identity, is vastly inapposite.
Ironically, although it may be considered socially acceptable in Sambia to
have sexual contact with members of the same sex, the fact that Sambian
culture failed to recognize the possibility of homosexual or gay personhood
meant Kalutwo would never be able to form cognizable relationships with
others based on a shared sense of sexual identity. As Kalutwo's experience
illustrates, the absence of an independent gay identity may be profoundly
270. HERDT, supra note 8, at 122-23.
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alienating even if one can enjoy social acceptance as a man who engages in
same-sex sexual activities.
271
Such observations highlight the need for a greater recognition of the legal
differences between concepts of homosexuality based on personhood (as in the
substitutive model), versus concepts of homosexuality that are based solely
upon sexual behavior. As the ritualized model demonstrates, a self-concept
that is based on the latter, rather than the former, renders the legal issues
typically associated with gay civil rights, like recognition of same-sex
partnerships or civil rights protections based on sexual orientation, somewhat
untranslatable in the Sambian cultural context. Taking such differences into
account ultimately reveals the necessity for a more nuanced understanding of
some of the limitations of universalized concepts of gay personhood and
underscores the need for a valuable reassessment of identity-based civil rights
in other cultural contexts.
B. Challenging Compulsory Identification in India
The Sambian scenario is not merely a relic of pre-modernism. In the past
few years, several other movements outside of the West have also emphasized
how an overreliance on identity also excludes other individuals who engage in
same-sex sexual conduct. For example, at a recent civil rights conference in
South Asia, the leader of a Sri Lankan gay rights group declared, "[w]e need to
look at the way our people are identified in Asia and whether there is a need to
change the traditional Western labels and identities like gays, lesbians,
transsexuals, etc. and come out with our own identities that reflect Asian
society and are acceptable to local cultural norms. 272 Such rethinking of these
labels of identity has also extended to the realm of law, where many have
recognized that the exclusion of alternative models of sexual identity has
resulted in an excessively limited scope of protection.
The most visible movement advocating this view stems from the global
public health movement surrounding men's sexuality, which, in the wake of the
AIDS epidemic, has expressly resisted using terms of gay or bisexual
identification because of the risk of alienating individuals who engage in same-
sex sexual conduct, but who do not identify as "gay," "bisexual," or
"homosexual." Because individuals who engage in such contact do not self-
identify under these terms, they are not necessarily represented in the identity-
based strategies often used by legal activists who subscribe to a substitutive
model.
271. Herdt observes that Kalutwo was increasingly at odds with his male peers socially and was
often teased for his lack of wife or children. Id. at 123.
272. Feizal Samath, Rights-Asia: Sri Lankan Gay-Lesbian Rights Groups Plan [to] Meet, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 8, 1999.
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Consequently, instead of focusing on certain identities, public health
strategies have focused on behavior. This anti-identity approach, I would
argue, has emphasized the existence of a different construction of the
relationship between identity and conduct in which same-sex sexual behavior is
considered to be additive (or separate from), not substitutive to, sexual
identity.273 This represents an important break with conventional notions of
sexual identity and teaches us a number of complex lessons regarding the need
for privacy and autonomy-based strategies across the world. As I argue, the
existence of ritualized and additive models demonstrate that such protections
implicitly require privacy protections as a precondition to, rather than a
substitute for, other non-discrimination provisions based on sexual orientation.
1. The Additive Model of Sexual Identity and Conduct
In India, in the public health field, several prominent activists have
concluded that the language of '"identities" and Western constructions of
sexuality are markedly inappropriate in delivering culturally specific
HIV/AIDS health services to some men in South Asia.274 Instead of the term
"gay" or "homosexual," public health activists have opted to use the term "men
who have sex with men" (MSM). 271 The term MSM refers to men from all age
groups, marital status, economic classes, educational backgrounds, caste and
religious communities, sexual identities, and gender identities who engage in
sexual activity with other men.276 Use of the term, they argue, is necessary for
effective health interventions, because MSM do not possess a "gay" self-
identity, do not see themselves as bisexual, yet are not "conventionally
straight., 277  In other words, the term is used to denote those for whom
homosexuality connotes a behavior, not an identity. By examining the reduced
salience of terms like "gay" and "homosexual" among MSM, we can come to a
greater understanding of the culturally specific assumptions underlying them.
273. See also Tom Boellrstorff, The Perfect Path, Gay Men, Marriage, Indonesia, 5 GAY &
LESBIAN Q. 475-510 (1999).
274. Shivananda Khan, Culture, Religion and Human Rights, 15 NAz Ki PUKAR 18 (Oct. 1996).
275. Shaffiq Essajee, Interview with Anjali Gopalan, Executive Director of the Naz Foundation,
TRIKONE MAG., Oct. 1996, at 7 ("Not to say there are no gay men in India but this identity is sort of a
luxury that doesn't really extend beyond the educated upper classes. The majority of men who have sex
with men don't see themselves as gay or even homosexual.").
276. Deep Purkayastha, MSM Networks: Identity Categories versus Identity Continuum, 27 NAZ KI
PuKAR 16 (Oct. 1999).
277. JEREMY SEABROOK, LOVE IN A DIFFERENT CLIMATE 141 (1999). According to Shivananda
Khan, use of the term MSM slowly came into being because the term "gay men" or "homosexuals"
inadequately conflated identity with behavior. However, as Khan points out, even this term fails to
include transgendered entities, like the waria of Indonesia; the bakla of the Phillipines, and hyras in
India. See Shivananda Khan, The Risks of Categorization, 21 NAZ KI PUKAR 3 (Apr. 1998). A related
scenario is reported among some male sex workers in Thailand who engage in sexual intercourse with
both men and women, but who prefer having sex with women. Though they might describe themselves
as heterosexual in orientation and sexual preference, society sees them as homosexual or bisexual.
Roberts, supra note 14, at 245.
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Although I use India as a primary example of this phenomenon, largely
due to the body of literature that has developed on this topic, I do not mean to
suggest that the circumstances discussed here are entirely unique to India (or to
males) alone.278 However, the public health debates surrounding global efforts
at AIDS prevention have provided a fascinating and largely overlooked arena
in which dominant Western paradigms of gay identity have been soundly
rejected in favor of broader, more inclusive strategies of public health
intervention. A brief glimpse at this debate therefore exposes some limitations
in translating gay identity paradigms to cultures which lack the same
assumptions regarding the centrality of sexuality to personhood as in the West.
In South Asia, public health advocates report that they have found the
word "gay" to have "little meaning, political or otherwise," to many men who
have sexual relations with other men.279 Even where it appears, the term "gay"
is used to refer to a sexual behavior alone, rather than an identity in and of
itself, reflecting a perception shared by many public health experts that male-
to-male sexual activity is not a "widely acceptable criterion around which all
MSM can define themselves as a community.I28  tn stark contrast to the
United States' focus on identity as a mode of community building, for some
MSM, building a demarcable community around sexual conduct is
characterized as "unnecessary" and "devoid of meaning." 281 Thus, instead of
taking on a "gay" self-identity, MSM may adopt instead a variety of indigenous
terms and identities to describe particular sexual behaviors; or none at all.
The proliferation of competing identities demonstrates the difference
between the concept of a fixed and stable perceptions of gay identity and the
282
more fluid sexuality of many men and women throughout the world. As a
prominent public health activist describes,
In India, for the majority of men who have sex with men, personal
identity is not seen as the main [] issue. Behaviours are constructed
within cultural frameworks of compulsory marriage and procreation, in
terms of homosociability, lack of privacy, extended and joint family
networks and so on. What we have then is a range of sexualities, a
range of homosexualities and homosexual behaviours, a range of
278. See, e.g., Stephen 0. Murray, Male Homosexuality in Guatemala, in OUT IN THE FIELD, supra
note 56, at 239. 1 focus on India for two key reasons. First, because the literature produced by public
health activists who work among men in India is incredibly sophisticated in its approach to non-Western
organizations of gender, sexual identity, and sexuality. Second, the current state of affairs in India
represents yet another interesting model of how the emergent gay or lesbian-identified movement
negotiates its newfound visibility with preexisting social meanings concerning sexual behavior between
individuals.
279. Purkayastha, supra note 276, at 16. See also Chan et al., supra note 189, at S60; Debanuj
Dasgupta & Deep Purkayastha, Being in the Game, TRIKONE MAG., Apr. 1996, at 10.
280. Purkayastha, supra note 276, at 16.
281. Id.
282. SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 10, 13, 52.
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identities that very often are very differently constructed than in the
West.
283
Instead, sexual identity in the MSM community (similar to the sexual
systems described in the previous section on transgendered identity), is largely
determined by perceived sexual roles rather than the sex of the chosen
partner.28 4  This roughly translates into three different types of male
homosexualities-for each of which the term "gay" is profoundly insufficient
in India. For example, cultural norms in parts of South Asia suggest that a
perceived "penetrator," does not adopt a gay or homosexual identity.
285
Instead, among MSM, he is labeled a "giriya" or "panthi," which directly
translates to a "real [presumably heterosexually-identified] man," and who
would be greatly offended if he were described as gay or homosexual. To him,
only effeminate males can be thought of as such.28 6 A second group, deemed
"kothis," involves those who are thought to take a "passive," or "receptive"
role, and who exhibit gender variant characteristics, such as effeminacy. The
individuals comprising this group have an entirely different sexual identity than
the prior group, one which stems from their cultural association with norms of
287feminization. A third group consists of "hijras," who constitute the most
visible part of the MSM network because they are transgendered individuals.
288
And finally, there are also other terms used to describe particular kinds of
perceived behaviors and entities that fall outside of these groups.289 Because of
the persistence of such diverse sexualities and the divergence between each
283. Shivananda Khan, Community Action in Action, 10 NAz Ki PUKAR 14 (July 1995);
Shivananda Khan, Sexuality and Sexual Health in India, 14 NAz KI PUKAR 15 (July 1996) (making
same observation).
284. Chan, et al., supra note 189, at S60.
285. Carol Jenkins, Varieties of Homosexuality in Bangladesh, 24 NAz Ki PUKAAR 16 (Jan. 1999);
Purkayastha, supra note 276, at 16.
286. See Marion Lloyd, Out of India 's Antigay Closet, Producer Tries to Ease Strictures, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1999, at A34. As Jeremy Seabrook explains:
In many parts of the South, a distinction is sharply-and often falsely-made between the
macho role of the insertive partner and the feminized role of the receptive partner. The male
identity of the former is not thought to be impaired by the fact that he has sex with another
man ... This is why many people in the South do not recognize themselves in the "gay"
paradigm.
Jeremy Seabrook, Its What You Do, NEW INTERNATIONALIST 328 (October 2000).
287. It is worth adding that these terms are merely indigenous descriptive terms used by public
health specialists and others; there is wide anecdotal evidence that privately, individuals may undertake
roles that differ from perceived assignations. Moreover, it is also important to note that only a small
percentage of this second, "feminized" group of men are transgender-identified. See Purkayastha, supra
note 276, at 16.
288. Hijras constitute a separate religious community, some of whom participate in ritualized
castration, and others who are homosexual, transgendered, or impotent men. They are believed to be
endowed with religious authority, worship the Hindu goddess Bahuchara Mata, and participate in
theatrical blessings of children and newly weds. For more detailed discussion, see SERENA NANDA,
NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HIuRAs OF INDIA (1998).
289. See Shivananda Khan, Sexual Health Workshops in Bangladesh and India for Males who have
Sex with Males, 17 NAz Ki PUKAR 3-4 (Apr. 1996).
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identity, some have claimed that establishing the universality of gay identity is
290impossible.
Nevertheless, in the past few years, some public health activists have
declared that MSM is an identity, in and of itself. One public health expert,
Shivananda Khan, for example, who is an outspoken proponent of this view,
suggests that an intervention strategy that requires the assertion of a particular
sexual orientation will alienate those who desperately need public health
education on HIV prevention. He continues to elaborate:
South Asia has an incredibly diversity of identities, desires, and
frameworks of expression-a true queer space. Hijras, transvestites,
transgendered, gay-identified men... men/males who have sex with
other men/males, in all its variety of terminologies, behavioural
choices, desires and constructions. Are we truly saying that we should
reduce this diversity into the singular construction of a gay identity?
291
The increasing use of "MSM" to denote men who have sexual relations
with other men as an alternative identity, instead of a descriptive behavioral
term, has raised troubling questions and created fissures within the
international gay rights and public health communities. On a deeper level, its
very existence also challenges the dominant assumptions that often form the
basis of a gay identity, demonstrating the complex questions that are raised
when a person's internal identities differs from the legal categories of identity
that might apply to them.
At the most basic level, the question of whether MSM comprises a
coherent self-identity in its own right further complicates the divide that exists
between conduct and identity, forcing us to contemplate what comprises a
"gay" identity in comparison to MSM. According to public health advocates,
the 'Western' (or what I call 'substitutive') model of being gay is viewed as
resoundingly inappropriate.292 Rather, their observations suggest that the MSM
model of sexual identity is "additive," rather than substitutive, because it
demonstrates that one's sexual identity-heterosexual, homosexual, or
bisexual-can be entirely separated from one's sexual conduct or desire.
Three ideas underlie this resistance to identity-based strategies. First,
according to the MSM perspective, many who engage in same-sex sexual
conduct do not identify, and will never identify, as gay, homosexual, or
bisexual. They see their sexual orientation as heterosexual, and consider their
same-sex sexual activities to be a completely separate pastime, rather than a
determinative part of their identities. In contrast, as we have seen, a "gay"
identity under the substitutive paradigm is thought to assume "an identification
290. See SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 86.
291. Shivananda Khan, Kothis, Gays, and (other) MSM, TRIKONE MAG. at 14 (October 2000).




of the self with a life-style based on a different sexuality, acquired after a
struggle with the self and in solidarity with other 'different' individuals.,
293
Yet, in some other contexts, as I have argued, the social meaning of
homosexuality may be equated with transgenderism rather than a preference
for same-sex sexual activity. Consequently, few non-transgendered persons
may identify themselves as gay or lesbian to avoid raising such connotations.294
Many individuals who engage in same-sex sexual conduct will resist adopting
identities that suggest any degree of gender role transgression.
Second, according to many public health activists, some MSM view the
term "gay" as a Western, stigmatizing label, something to avoid rather than to
295embrace. Contrary to the focus placed on sexual identity and gay
personhood in the substitutive model, among MSM, the constitution of the self
may be conceived as entirely separate from one's sexual activities, a difference
which often has determinative implications on whether or not people choose to
"come out." Instead of sexual identity, these scholars argue, other roles
determined by family, society, religious affiliation, or occupation may take on a
central role, subsuming personhood, individuality and self.296 This observation
is also made by an activist in India:
Most men who call themselves "gay" are married or desire to be
married. For them being "gay" means being erotically aroused by
men... The debate around marriage and identity is different in India.
Identity is based on class, caste and religious affiliations. Sexual
desire is not the focal point of our identities. Hence there is an
acceptance of the multi-dimensional personality. One has to perform
the duties of husband, or wives, daughters or sons, mother or father,
intimate friend simultaneously.
297
293. See De Lind van Winjngaarden, in LADY Boys, TOM Boys, RENT BOYS, supra note 1, at 216.
In India, one man notes, "[i]t is a historical paradox that those who say to me "Why do you not come
out?" are nearly all Westerners or Indians living in the West." SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 140. The
absence of coming out narratives may also be complicated by the lack of individualism and privacy
norms among many in India. Id. at 141; see also HERDT, supra note 8, at 20.
294. In India, for example, some men who have sex with men fear that having openly same-sex
relationships may lead to being classified as a transgendered person (known as a hyra). HERDT, supra
note 8, at 147. The same has been reported in the Phillipines, where masculine-identified men may
resist adopting terms that suggest a common identity with transgendered persons. For example, one
Philippine man "described his alarm that he might be 'abnormal,' the abnormality being defined as a
contradiction between his being attracted to other men, and yet never having the desire to cross-dress."
Michael Tan, From Bakla to Gay, in CONCEIVING SEXUALITY, supra note 88, at 88. Another example
discusses a man who wrote to a newspaper columnist about his feelings for other men, calling them
"strange" because "I am cursed with an athletic body.... I cannot do what the bakla [transgendered
female] would do externally-act effeminately, dress effeminately, etc." Id. at 89-90.
295. See Shivananda Khan, Community Action in Action, supra note 283 (noting perception that
homosexual behavior is equivalent to Western "corruption.").
296. Dasgupta & Purkayashta, supra note 279, at 10 ("Collective living, community shame or pride
and social duty constitute the all-pervasive set-up within which we live our lives in India. The notion of
'self' is coterminous with the socialized self."); see also Essajee, supra note 275, at 7 ("We don't have a
sense of self in our culture, we are brothers or daughters or sons or wives-so how can we form sexual
identities?").
297. Dasgupta & Purkayastha, supra note 279, at 10.
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In many situations, material conditions force individuals to prioritize family
over social identification, a factor that is complemented by the strong
boundaries that exist between public identity and private conduct."'
Thus, the very idea of "coming out," so revered in identity discourse, is
considered by some to be based on an individualistic view of identity that is
often unprecedented in many non-Western families.299 As one writer observed,
an individual asserting personal space within the society is viewed as a
300threat. Since the community and family are often viewed as key vehicles of
security, many Asian persons choose instead to place their sexuality and sexual
identity as secondary in order to maintain family honor and harmony.3°1 As
one author concludes, "[flor many Asians, the notion of 'coming out' as a
means of breaking the silence around homosexuality is a 'very white
model."'
3 02
The constant pull of familial, rather than individual self-identification,
represents a serious break with the "gay ghetto" model often referred to in the
United States because it suggests that family identification may serve as a
serious, preclusive obstacle to gay self-identification. "For many gay-
identified men in the Western world, support for the self and social
identification has been found within the context of a gay community, coupled
with gay neighborhoods, establishments, and organizations. Such membership,
however, is premised upon-and requires-a shift of referent group from the
family to the peer group, which is a re-working of social support systems and
personal loyalties away from the family of origin," one scholar points out. 303
Yet the required shift from family support to gay-identified peers thus
represents one of the of the primary obstacles to gay self-identification
throughout the non-Western world. Here, a joint family system often means
that a person's individual self-identity can be entirely precluded from
developing into a substitutive, gay identity.
One contributing cause of this divergence between identity and conduct is
the emphasis placed on fulfillment of the institution of marriage, which is often
seen "as an essential requirement for maintaining the family, as a family duty,
as a sign of obedience to one's parents. '304 For this reason, many MSM-gay-
identified or not, are often married to women in India and elsewhere. 305 The
notion that a person may be married and self-identify as a "gay man," or
298. Id.
299. KHAN, supra note 178, at 17-18.
300. Dasgupta & Purkayastha, supra note 279, at 10.
301. SHIVANANDA KHAN, supra note 178, at 17, 29.
302. Storer, supra note 174, at 12 (quoting from Russell Leong, ed., ASIAN-AMERICAN
SEXUALITIES (1995). See also Manalansan, supra note 109, at 498 (reaching the same conclusion with
respect to some Filipino men: "coming out is a 'foreign thing'-totally American and not at all
Filipino.").
303. Rafael Diaz, LATINO GAY MEN AND HIV 102 (1998).
304. KHAN, supra note 178, at 21.
305. Essajee, supra note 275, at 7.
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"homosexual" is vexing for some Western activists.306  However, contrary to
many Western legal and cultural perceptions of homosexuality, a gay identity
(and love relationships between men) is often viewed as entirely compatible
with a heterosexual marriage.
Stories of married gay men also complicate the universality of the "coming
out" rhetoric which dominates much of the discourse that surrounds gay rights
307in America and Europe. The combination of being married and gay, for one
thing, markedly conflicts with Nan Hunter's observation that "[s]elf-
representation of one's sexual identity necessarily includes a message that one
has not merely come out, but that one intends to be out-to act on and live out
that identity. 30 8 It also similarly belies William Eskridge's claim that "coming
out of the closet as a gay person is also an explicitly political act., 30 9  Here,
coming out as gay implies only a behavioral tendency, rather than a certain
kind of political advocacy.310
2. Implications for Globalizing Gay Rights
Such differences force us to rethink many of the foundational assumptions
that many legal activists often associate with gay civil rights. MSM activists
openly challenge the drive towards essentializing the public aspects of a "gay"
or "homosexual" identity. On one hand, they exemplify that a singular focus
on sexual orientation and sexual identity may actually alienate other individuals
who engage in same-sex sexual conduct and who lack a predetermined
assumption of sexual orientation as a determinative characteristic of
personhood .3  Yet, on the other hand, those who demonstrate an
306. Boellstorff, supra note 273, at 490.
307. In India, it is reported that many men and women tend to not think of life outside marriage as
an option. See Lloyd, supra note 286, at A34.
308. Hunter, supra note 64, at 1696 ("To be openly gay, when the closet is an option, is to function
as an advocate as well as a symbol.").
309. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out ": Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411,2443 (1997).
310. As Tom Boellstorff has pointed out in his study of MSM in Indonesia, gay subjectivities do
not hinge on the same concept of disclosure to spheres of home, workplace or God. Instead, gay
identities are "additive, rather than substitutive: opening them does not necessarily imply closing" other
identities. Boellstorff, supra note 273, at 496. As Boellerstorf concluded in his study:
We find not an epistemology of the closet but an epistemology of life worlds, where healthy
subjectivity depends not on integrating diverse domains of life and having a unified,
unchanging identity in all situations but on separating domains of life and maintaining their
borders against he threat of gossip and discovery.
Id.
311. As one Kuwaiti-bom man (now living in the U.S. explained):
The Arab world is very much into the family unit and men must fulfill their family role. But
as long as they do that, they are free to do whatever they want and this is not questioned.
And since nobody talks about homosexuality, they don't have to fear somebody is going to
say this-or even think about them ... To them, being gay is a sexual thing. It's not
emotional. And the tiny minority who do see themselves as gay in the Western sense-as
loving men-are frustrated; they feel oppressed the most. The rest of the men are very
comfortable. They think it's the best of all possible worlds. Since nobody recognized
homosexuality as even existing, they can get away with things we cannot get away with here
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unwillingness to name oneself, or to "come out" as "gay" or "lesbian" in a
political sense also precludes the possibility of inclusion in the advocacy and
community building that is so integral to the gay community's identity-based
claims. However, the movement to overturn sodomy laws in India yields an
interesting contrast to the identity-based paradigm that we see in the United
States. The Indian example forces us to reconsider the various roles of privacy
and nondiscrimination protections in law to decide which alternative is more
preferable in a cross-cultural setting: privacy or identity-based strategies
towards gay civil rights.
Although it may be true that the focus on overturning sodomy laws is a
shared characteristic of many gay rights movements across the globe, the
Indian example demonstrates some key insights that are often overlooked by
activists who favor the substitutive model. In marked contrast to the
Zimbabwe example (which largely embraced the substitutive model and
emphasized the seeming universality of gay identity), the Indian gay rights
movement has increasingly-and visibly--emphasized the substitutive model's
disutility in both culture and law.
In this section, I attempt to identify some of the significance put forth by
this "additive" construction of sexual identity; and then to evaluate the
implications of these differences in laws surrounding sexual orientation. While
the additive construction yields some fruitful insights regarding the limitations
of identity-based movements in global campaigns for gay civil rights, a purely
additive construction, perhaps unwittingly, also runs the risk of echoing many
of the cultural relativist arguments often used to oppose gay civil rights
worldwide. Consequently, this section argues for the necessity of integrating
both the additive and substitutive models of sexual identity in one coherent
continuum.
How would integrating the additive and substitutive models of sexual
identity alter current gay rights strategies in a legal sense? Consider this
instructive example. In 1995, following the incident in Zimbabwe, the
Netherlands government instructed their embassies in developing countries to
provide support for lesbian and gay activists to challenge government abuse of
their human rights.3 12 Consequently, Shivananda Khan, an AIDS public health
expert in India, wrote to request support towards developing sexual health
services for men who have sexual relations with men in India. His request,
however, was denied on the grounds that the Netherlands government was only
[in the United States]. But if you start talking about homosexuality, they get very
uncomfortable.
Stephen Murray & Will Roscoe, eds., ISLAMIC HOMOSEXUALITIES, at 16-17 (1997).
312. Shivananda Khan, Culture, Religion and Human Rights. supra note 274, at 18-19. For an
excellent article on incorporating different forms of identity (transgendered and otherwise) within a
strategy of AIDS prevention, see Sean Patrick Larvie, Queerness and the Specter of Brazilian National
Ruin, 5 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 527-558, 537 (1999) (envisioning an inclusive strategy of AIDS prevention
that embraces localized forms of identity).
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specifically interested in human rights for lesbians and gay men in developing
countries, not HIV/AIDS issues.313
Yet, for many sexual minorities, this is a false distinction. As Khan
remarks, under the paradigm offered by the Netherlands government, MSM are
deemed to be "invisible," and "nonexistent" unless they self-consciously
adopted a lesbian, gay, or bisexual sexual orientation.314 Yet, as the discussion
above indicates, adoption of a self-conscious gay identity is not nearly as
simple in contexts which lack the same assumptions of the centrality of sexual
identity to personhood. "Within this context of meanings, cultures and
religions," Khan has emphasized, "Western constructions cannot just be
transposed from one culture to another. They are not absolutes in themselves
and culture free.,
315
On the other hand, however, a purely anti-identity approach puts some
individuals in a politically vulnerable position, foreclosing the possibility of
universalized categories of protection. An overreliance on behavior alone,
without exploring its connotations for one's sexual identity, can preclude gay
self-identification and prevent the development of an autonomous, politicized
gay community. This preclusion has several real-world disadvantages, among
them, the absence of creating possibilities for community mobilization and
building relationships between individuals who share similar predispositions
towards a certain identity.
Nevertheless in a basic sense, the existence of MSM-an identity based on
conduct alone-forces us to think more critically about how to build strategies
of inclusion when personal desires, sexual behavior, subjective identity, and
316public identities take vastly different expressions. For these reasons, rather
than enforcing a substitutive lesbian or gay identity, many activists have
recognized the diminishing utility of such categories, and made the evaluation
of categories of sexual identity an essential, active part of their platform. And,
on a more abstract level, these evaluations challenge others to recognize
cultural difference while preserving a framework of civil rights for sexual
minorities.
Here, again, India offers Western activists an interesting case study. One
might think that a gay and lesbian civil rights movement and a public health
movement might be diametrically opposed in interests. The first, as we have
seen in the United States, focuses on visibility though identity; whereas the
second focuses on behavior, rather than identity. Yet, I argue that the Indian




316. See Shivananda Khan, The Language of Sexuality, 5 NAZ Ki PUKAR 14 (Feb. 1994) (noting
that differences in language, religion, gender constructions and roles affect whether the terms lesbian,
homosexual, bisexual are appropriate terminology).
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identity, while offering arguments for gay rights and sexual equality-aptly
demonstrate the importance of integrating both the additive and substitutive
formulations in gay civil rights.
The timing of such efforts is especially crucial. Like the situations I have
reported in Zimbabwe and Egypt, Indian authorities are currently cracking
down on lesbian and gay visibility through an increasingly common tactic of
using sodomy laws to harass gay and lesbian activists. Indeed, it is perhaps
most ironic that the laws that have been used towards prosecution are the very
emblem of colonial exports, and have long been abandoned by the country
from which it originated. Although there are no laws which expressly
criminalize homosexual status, Article Three Hundred and Seventy-Seven, of
British origin, criminalizes "unnatural offenses" and remains in force today.31 7
The text of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:
Of unnatural offences: whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse
against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall be
liable to fine.318
Section 377 has applied to males who engage in sexual relations with one
another, particularly the "insertive" partner. 319 Although courts have reduced
the sentence for some mitigating circumstances (like consent), it still remains in
320force. In one 1983 case, Fazal Rab vs. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court of
India observed that:
The offence is one under Section 377 Indian Penal Code which implies
sexual perversity. No force appears to have been used .... nor the
fact that in some countries homosexuality has ceased to be an offence,
has influenced our thinking.
3 21
These laws have not lain dormant. Three years after the lesbian and gay
rights movement gained international notoriety in the wake of the events
surrounding Fire, discussed in Part III, police began a visible crackdown. In
July of 2001, police in the city of Lucknow raided the offices of two
organizations who work on behalf of MSM, confiscating AIDS-education
materials, arresting, and detaining staff. The men were charged with
possession of obscene materials (including under a statute prohibiting the
317. See SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 162.
318. Indian Penal Code, Section 377 (1860).
319. Dhir, supra note 10, at 4. The "passive" partner is considered an abettor to the offence, and
may be charged under an additional section of the Code. Id. Between men and women, it has also
served as grounds for divorce if the sexual behavior was not consensual. See Section 13, Hindu
Marriage Act; Section 11, Divorce Act (permitting a wife to apply for divorce if her husband is guilty of
sodomy or bestiality).
320. See Dhir, supra note 10, at 5.
321. Shrikant Bant, Indian Law and the Homosexual, 1(2) BOMBAY DoST 5 (1990). At the same
time, however, given that the acts were consensual, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence from three
years to six months rigorous imprisonment. Id.
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indecent representation of women) and with conspiracy to commit sodomy.
322
The Senior Superintendent of Police concluded that both agencies were running
"gay clubs" and spreading gay culture throughout Lucknow.323 A court refused
bail for the employees on the grounds that the employees were "a group of
persons indulging in these activities [sodomy] ... and polluting the entire
society by encouraging the young persons and abetting them [sic] them to
committing the offence of sodomy.,
324
At the outset, one can see a striking similarity between Hardwick and the
discussion surrounding Section 377, because both statutes criminalize sodomy
but are applied to (and equated with) criminalizing homosexual identity.
325
Like Padula's classification of sodomy as the "behavior that defines the class,"
Section 377 has been used to label gays and lesbians as potential criminals by
virtue of their assumed propensity to engage in acts of sodomy. While the
number of actual cases filed in recent years is extremely low, 32 6 the impact of
the law lies in its coercive effect in repressing same-sex sexual activity and gay
327or lesbian self-identification. Here, activists have also argued that section
377 is used with alarming regularity to harass, threaten, and silence gay
organizing.
328
322. See IGLHRC Action Alert: India. Demand the Immediate Release of HIV/AIDS Prevention
Workers Detained Under Sodomy and Obscenity Laws at http://www.iglhrc.org/world/s-
asia/India200iJul_2.html (July 25, 2001).
323. Id. See also Aditya Bondyopadhyay, State-Supported Suppression and Persecution of Sexual
Minorities in India, Statement before the United Nations Comm'n on Human Rights (April 8, 2002) (on
file with author).
324. IGLHRC Action Alert, supra note 322.
325. Sherry Joseph, The Law and Homosexuality in India, International Conference on Preventing
Violence, Caring for Survivors: Role of Health Professionals and Services in Violence, at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/Organizations/healthnet/Sasia/suchana/0909/rh374.html (Nov. 28-30,
1998) ("de jure, [Section 377] is an attempt to criminalize sodomy while de facto it is an attempt to
criminalize and stigmatise homosexuality.").
326. See Dhir, supra note 10, at 5 (noting 30 total cases between 1860 and 1992, the majority of
which dealt with non-consensual intercourse and assaults on minors); see also Working Group on
Lesbian and Gay Rights, Mumbai, Background Paper: Strategies to Advance Lesbian and Gay Rights,
at 4-5, available at http://www.altindia.net/altsex/background%20paper.htm (November 7-9, 1997).
327. See Bondyopadhyay, supra note 323 ("In India, Section 377 of the Penal Code hangs like a
Damocles' sword over the heads of all sexual minorities.").
328. In Mumbai in 1990, police began a series of arrests of men gathering in a public park for no
reason other than they "looked" "like homosexuals." Dhir, supra note 10. The same happened in an
another park in Lucknow, where a spokesman explained that "police will not allow male couples into
the park if they know they are gays," a spokesman explained. "Policemen will ask them if they are gay.
If they hold hands or are demonstrative about their affection, we'll suspect them of being gay." Rex
Wockner, Indian Gays Banned From Park, www.wockner-news.com at #245 (Jan. 4, 1999). In India, as
in many countries, the involvement of the police has led to a corrupt, and often dangerous collusion.
The police will enter public gathering places for men to seek sex with other men, and then rape or extort
sex from those arrested. See Bondyopadhyay, supra note 323.
In addition, in India, a panoply of other laws have been used to prevent the development of
gay organizing or HIV education-namely, Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides that
any conduct that occurs in a public place that constitutes an injury, annoyance, or danger to the public is
a punishable offense; and Section 292, which refers to obscenity, and which has been used by customs
officials to prevent distribution of gay and lesbian magazines. See Dhir, supra note 10, at 6; Mihir
Desai, Civil Laws Affecting Gays and Lesbians, at http://alt.india.net/altsex/toc.html.
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As recent cases illustrate, sodomy laws in India take on extraordinarily
public dimensions, demonstrating that Section 377 is still used by police to
imprison both MSM and gay-identified movements. Such criminalization
prevents self-identified gays and lesbians from "coming out of the closet" and
from forming a centralized community.329  Irrespective of whether MSM
individuals self-identify as gay or bisexual, or even heterosexual, Indian law
enforcement officials label MSM-simply by virtue of their location in a
public place, or by their willingness to show affection for members of the same
sex-as foundational evidence of a gay or homosexual identity. Here, the
law's vague language leads to its expansive interpretation: rather than simply
outlawing sodomy, such laws can be used to outlaw all forms of public
affection between men altogether.
330
Indeed, the law has also been used to criminalize lesbian relationships. In
1987, an individual named Tarulata/Tarun Kumar underwent a female-to-male
sex change operation, and married a woman named Lila two years later. Lila's
father filed a petition in Gujarat High Court, demanding that the marriage be
annulled because it was a lesbian relationship, arguing, "Tarun Kumar
possesses neither the male organ nor any natural mechanism of cohabitation,
sexual intercourse and procreation of children." The case called for criminal
penalties under Section 377, and is apparently still pending in Gujarat High
Court.33'
Because of Section 377's continued force in preventing both the public and
private expressions of homosexuality, activists in India have launched a
campaign for its repeal that concentrates specifically on the law's colonial
origins. This move first began after prison personnel in Delhi refused to
provide condoms to inmates, reasoning that condom distribution would
encourage male-to-male sexual behavior, thereby leading to violations of
332section 377. In many ways, the prison officials' argument surrounding
Section 377 reflects much of the earlier jurisprudence favored by expansionist
readings of Hardwick. Again, like Padula's recognition of "state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class," Section 377 labeled gays and
lesbians, as well as MSM, as accomplices or criminals.
In response, a human rights group filed a petition challenging the
constitutional validity of Section 377, and to enjoin jail authorities from
sequestering those prisoners who were HIV positive or identified with
homosexual sexual activity. The legal challenge posed to Section 377 is
329. Neelesh Misra, Indian Lesbians Demand Decriminalisation of Homosexuality, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 10, 2000. There are also other laws, specifically the Dramatic Performances Act and the
Indecent Representation of Women Act, which contain similarly pernicious potential to stifle gay and
lesbian self expression. For a detailed summary of the laws of India affecting gay men, lesbians,
bisexuals, and other sexual minorities, see Desai, supra note 328.
330. See Katherine Bell, Gay Sex Prosecuted Worldwide, PLANETOUT NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000.
331. Background Paper, supra note 326.
332. Dhir, supra note 10 at 6.
(Vol. 14: 97
Exporting Identity
extremely different than the one used in Hardwick in several key aspects, each
of which separately underscores the limitations of the substitutive model, and
demonstrates how emerging, non-Western gay movements often confront
different challenges-and opportunities-because of the government's
tendency to view homosexuality as a "foreign," "Western" disease.
By focusing squarely on men who have sex with men in their constitutional
challenge, rather than gay-identified men, the brief filed against Section 377
aptly demonstrates why eliminating sodomy laws will build a more inclusive
community by removing a key obstacle to gay self-identification:
criminalization of sodomy. In other words, activists recognized that
consideration of MSM issues underscores the enormous need for protection of
conduct and privacy-based protections.333
Yet rather than focusing on identity as a central platform, the attempt to
repeal Section 377 has focused on building a continuum of rights strategies that
has both included and transcended the substitutive model. As Shivenanda
Khan has emphasized, a gay rights movement must begin at the place where
individuals are at in terms of their self-identity, not where the movement would
334like them to be. By avoiding the representation of plaintiffs who identify as
"gay" in the substitutive sense, gay human rights activists in India were able to
avoid some of the accusations of Westernization and foreign influence that
often plague gay rights strategies in other contexts, like Zimbabwe.
Under this trajectory, in India, privacy protections appear to be sought as a
precondition to other rights based on sexual orientation. This strategy builds
upon the substantial jurisprudence in Indian law that mirrors the American
conception of privacy, intersecting privacy with two other elements; personal
expression and sexual autonomy under the right to "life and liberty" under
Article 21 of the Indian constitution.335 In India, the Supreme Court has
interpreted this right to include "the right to live with human dignity and all
that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life ... and also
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings. 336 Significantly, in India, the right to
privacy includes a right to identity, as a bedrock Indian case on the right to
privacy makes clear: "any plausible definition of the right to privacy is bound
to take human body as its first and most basic reference for control over
personal identity. Such a definition is bound to include body's inviolability
and integrity and intimacy of personal identity, including marital privacy.
337
333. Id.
334. Khan, supra note 291, at 14.
335. For example, in India, the right to privacy, like the United States, is a judge-made instrument.
See Martha C. Nussbaum, India: Implementing Sex Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INTL. L. 35, 48
(2001).
336. Id. at 50 (citing Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, 68 AIR SC
746, 747 (1981)).
337. Id. at 53 (citing Sareetha v. T Venkata Subbaiah, 70 AIR AP 356 (1983)) (emphasis added).
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This interpretation of personal identity mirrors a similar preoccupation in
gay rights circles in India with the right to determine both the interior and
exterior aspects of a person's sexuality; in other words, to evaluate the
relevance and importance of "coming out." But this difference also carries
important lessons for gay rights strategies elsewhere. In other words, a strategy
that focuses primarily on the right to privacy before identity-based protections
allows an individual the autonomy to determine his or her sexual identity and
preferences, instead of forcing them to adopt a particular identity in order to
access constitutional protection. In other words, by demanding the right to
privacy, Indian activists are actually demanding the right to deliberate-and
determine-the interior and exterior aspects of their sexual identity, for
themselves, and not as a prerequisite for a particular legal entitlement.
According to activists, this choice to focus on privacy, rather than identity,
was strategically motivated by cultural concerns about the changing social
meaning of homosexuality in India. Apparently, advocates feared that a
visible, identity-based approach would alienate those who were uncomfortable
with gay civil rights and the general public visibility afforded to the nascent
movement. As the Campaign for Lesbian Rights in India explained:
... [T]he appeal to privacy rather than homosexual rights in their
petition was a tactical move suggested by senior members of the
Supreme Court, among whom the [human rights group] had
campaigned. This strategy was supposed to ensure that the petition
itself was not rejected, as it would have been had it harped on
homosexuality being legitimized in the public and private sphere.
Since the Supreme Court had already settled the right to privacy...
that judgment served as a useful precedent for the purpose of the
petition. After the petition was accepted, then the issue of
338homosexuality and rights could be raised in the final arguments.
By choosing MSM, rather than "gay" or "homosexual" plaintiffs, Indian gay
activists implicitly recognized that a privacy-based strategy towards
constitutional protection is much more inclusive than a anti-discrimination
model because it does not require a certain self-identification or expression to
access its protections, nor does it require a formal recognition of the public
aspects of gay personhood.1
39
Interestingly, at the same time that Indian activists appeared to favor a non-
identitarian approach to overturning Section 377, and a localized construction
338. See Lesbian Emergence, supra note 121, at 49. The privacy case cited is in reference to
another bedrock case in India that delineated the right to privacy (ironically, with ample use of case law
from the United States). See Nussbaum, supra note 335, at 52-53.
339. It is important to note, however, that the concept of privacy rights is often contested by many
feminists in India, who point out that state intervention into the supposedly "private" aspects of the
home is often needed to protect women from domestic violence, incest, and marital rape. See Lesbian
Emergence, supra note 121, at 49; and Martha Nussbaum, Is Privacy Bad for Women, BOSTON REVIEW
(April 2000) at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR25.2/nussbaum.html (analyzing Indian and American
constitutional treatments of privacy).
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of identity, they have also resisted taking a culturally relativistic approach to
human rights. 340 The plaintiffs, for example, argued that Section 377 violates
the Indian Constitution's right to fundamental rights of life and liberty, and the
right to privacy enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This
difficult balance of resisting relativism while favoring a more culturally
appropriate treatment of homosexuality carries important lessons for any
society that seeks to build a more multicultural platform of gay rights, because
it suggests that it is indeed possible to balance cultural sensitivity with
universal models of equality and non-discrimination.
Yet, despite the brief's clear emphasis on privacy instead of identity, it
does reflect a tacit recognition of the growing importance of gay personhood in
Indian civil rights. Quite unlike Hardwick, which failed to distinguish between
sodomy and identity, the plaintiffs also argued in their brief that the law
violates Article 14's equal protection clause since it discriminates against
persons based on their sexual orientation.34' In this manner the brief paid equal
attention to sodomy laws' attacks on both conduct and identity. In other
words, even if a "gay identity" did not necessarily exist among the MSM
plaintiffs, the brief argued that they were still entitled to protection on the basis
of privacy as well as their sexual orientation.
Finally, the brief also-quite unusually-resists looking to the West for
guidance, a factor which further demonstrates the diminished utility of the
substitutive model. By identifying the "Western" underpinnings of gay and
lesbian criminality (indeed, the law was an export from British colonialism),
gay and lesbian activists accomplished a marvelous reversal. Indeed, a
substantial portion of the constitutional arguments offered for reversal
342concentrate on the law's foreign character, pointing out that the law was
outdated and "archaic," given its repeal in Britain. Here, the Indian gay
movement utilized anti-Western rhetoric of Hindu cultural purists to expose a
crucial irony: Section 377 was not enacted by Indians, but by the British during
colonialism.
This unique strategy has led to a remarkable coalition between progressive
human rights activists, public health activists and gay and lesbian activists who
opt to challenge both the enforcement of identity-based categories and the
sodomy laws that exist in India. Its localizing of a strategy for gay rights,
coupled with a reexamination of its foundational precepts, reflects an important
reassessment of the global utility of the identity-based, substitutive model.
Instead of the government serving as a defender of Indian cultural purity and
heterosexual tradition, gay and lesbian activists demonstrated that the central
340. See Dhir, supra note 10, at 6.
341. The plaintiffs also argued that the term "carnal intercourse" is void for vagueness; and that
forced sodomy is incomparable with consensual sexual acts between men. Id.
342. Dhir, supra note 10, at 6.
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tool wielded by the Indian government-section 377- is nothing more than
leftover baggage from colonialism. Like those who blamed the West for
exporting gay identity, gay and lesbian activists similarly blamed the West for
its exported criminalization of such behavior. In sum, the remarkable duality
that this movement demonstrates-challenging the enforcement of substitutive
categories of sexual identity, while challenging the criminalization of
sodomy--exemplifies a profound possibility for powerful civil rights models.
VI. REFRAMING SEXUAL AUTONOMY
As the Indian experience suggests, current debates over gay rights involve
much more than the simple legal question of whether or not individuals deserve
protections based on the category of sexual orientation. Instead, in this
changing era of globalization and cosmopolitanism, the questions posed by
such debates (both legal and nonlegal) are much more complex because they
also raise questions about culture, tradition, and the response of law. Here, law
has played a central role by serving as a tool for activists to demand
constitutional inclusion and as a target that engenders further activism. Yet,
the response of Indian activists suggests that it is possible to present the world
with a dynamic, pluralistic view of law, culture and sexuality that transcends
the limitations of an identity-based model.
As I have argued, the current choice between strategies of protection for
sexual minorities-one focusing on privacy, another focusing on
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation-are distressingly
simplistic and underinclusive of the different permutations between identity
and conduct that exist with respect to human sexuality, both in the United
States, as well as abroad. As I have argued, a person's subjectivity, or sense of
self, may differ from the outward sexual identity which he/she may adopt. This
dissonance between external identity, internal subjectivity, and conduct-when
combined with the role culture plays in constructing each-throws the
American framework of identity politics into question.343 What is needed,
then, is a new legal framework for thinking about global gay rights that takes
these potential, cultural differences into account.
One way to overcome the dissonance--cultural, legal, subjective--
between one's conduct and one's social and sexual identity is to turn to another
framework that encompasses both the expressive and private aspects of
sexuality and sexual identity: sexual autonomy, or sexual self-determination.
In this section, I argue that a focus on sexual autonomy is preferable to one
based on identity for three primary reasons. First, a model based on sexual
autonomy is a deliberative one, thereby encompassing potential dissonance




between subjectivity and external representation. Second, a sexual autonomy
model focuses more squarely on the protection of sexual conduct, so that it
includes protection for individuals who may engage in same-sex sexual
conduct but who view themselves as heterosexual. Third, protections based on
sexual autonomy are expressive, in that they protect the freedoms of individuals
to express their public gender or sexual identities, and publicly voice the need
for such protections. Finally, because the right to sexual autonomy
encompasses aspects of both identity-based and privacy protections, it provides
a much more thorough conceptual and legal framework for protection than
existing models, which normally focus on either framework to the exclusion of
other possibilities.
The contemporary definition of sexual autonomy, as scholars such as
Stephen Schulhofer has emphasized, centers on the freedom to seek sexual
fulfillment and freedom from sexual coercion. 44 It is the product of a complex
interaction of conditions, requiring both mental competency, an awareness of
one's options, and sufficient information to choose between various
possibilities, i.e. whether or not to become sexually intimate with another
person. 345 Schulhofer also defines sexual autonomy in terms of (1) an internal
dimension, involving the moral and intellectual capacity to choose without
impermissible pressures and limitations; (2) an external dimension involving a
freedom from impermissible pressures and constraints; and (3) a physical
346dimension, comprising the bodily integrity of a person.
While Schulhofer examines sexual autonomy through the lens of sexual
intimacy, it is clear that his observations can be easily extended to the realm of
sexual identity. Quite usefully, he defines sexual autonomy in terms of an
"active" facet-namely, the right to determine the kind of life one wishes to
live, and the kind of activities one may wish to pursue-and in terms of a "right
of refusal"-involving the right to refuse to undertake certain activities with
others. 34 7 And Schulhofer also points out how social conditions--cultural
influences, education, the realistic availability of alternative options, and a
culture that supports personal introspection--can have an enormous impact on
348ensuring a person's autonomous decisions.
I add two ingredients to this definition of sexual autonomy: "deliberation"
and "expression." The "deliberative" aspect of sexual autonomy extends the
right to privacy to include both personal deliberation about subjective identity,
344. See Katherine K. Baker, Unwanted Supply, Unwanted Demand, 3 GREEN BAG 103 (1999)
(reviewing STEVEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW (1998)).
345. SCHULHOFER, supra note 344, at 111.
346. See id.; and Stephen Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
11 J. L. & PHIL. 35, 70-71 (1992).
347. SCHULHOFER, supra note 344, at 99.
348. Id. at 106.
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and the "expressive" quality extends sexual autonomy to include the outward
expression of that identity.
The idea of deliberative sexual autonomy is not without precedent, as the
Indian experience suggests. Consider what the Supreme Court in the United
States has also said about privacy, a right that it often links to rights for
expressive association and intimate association in constitutional law. As
defined by Justice Blackmun in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the right of
privacy includes "the principle that personal decisions that profoundly affect
bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of
government., 349  The joint opinion in Casey also states, "[a]t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."'350 Indeed, Professor James
Fleming has argued that this explication of privacy, by its terms, reflects a
concern for personal deliberation about subjective identity and the outward
expression of that identity.
351
The same can also be said for Stevens' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,
which mentions the "individual's right to make certain unusually important
decisions that will affect his own, or his family's destiny," and "the abiding
interest in individual liberty, that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's
right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable., 352 So too, Justice
Blackmun, who characterizes (as Fleming points out) the "freedom of intimate
association" to include the "decisional and spatial aspects of the right to
privacy., 353 In Fleming's view, rights that involve bodily integrity, decisional
autonomy, and integrity involving "persons' destiny, identity, or way of life,"
constitute basic liberties that are significant preconditions for deliberative
autonomy.35 4
While Professor Fleming's arguments are couched in the rubric of privacy,
they can be refrained profitably to emphasize the sexual aspects of autonomy
undergirding both Casey and Hardwick's dissents. As these cases suggest,
these liberties (regarding destiny, identity, and way of life) become even more
important when we consider the boundaries of the contested intersections
between sexual identity and sexual activity. Just as bodily integrity comprises
a certain type of personal sovereignty that is inviolate, a framework for
deliberative sexual autonomy permits individuals to make their own decisions
about how or whether or not they choose to adopt---or express-a particular
type of sexual identity. This kind of "sexual self-determination" draws a
boundary that allows persons to undertake their own process of deliberation to
349. 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992) (Blackmun, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
350. Id. at 851.
351. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 45 STANFORD L. REv. 1, 12 (1995).
352. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
353. Id. at 202, 204 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
354. Fleming, supra note 351, at 12.
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ultimately decide how they may choose to represent him or herself.355 Since
sexual autonomy includes the right to make one's decisions about bodily
integrity and sexual self-satisfaction, it also necessarily includes a decision
about identity: how to represent oneself.
These decisions about representation give rise to a further refinement of
sexual autonomy: expression. Under this framework, the right to sexual
autonomy should be understood as providing legal protection to permit
individuals to identify with a particular gender identity or sexual orientation if
desired, or none at all. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Hernandez-Montiel,
a male homosexual who may choose to dress as a woman in order to express
his sexual orientation is just as deserving of equal protection under the basis of
sexual orientation as any other person.356 Here, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
adopted a deliberative sexual autonomy model by recognizing that Geovanni's
volitional choice of sexual self-expression (dressing as a woman) did not
necessarily detract from the discrimination that he faced on the basis of his
sexual orientation. Instead, both his female sexual identity and his sexual
orientation were deemed inherent, fundamental characteristics of his
personality. 357  By casting Geovanni's choice to dress as a female as a
protected, outward, and expressive aspect of Geovanni's sexual orientation, the
court recognized that sexual identity goes beyond sexual conduct and extends
to the realm of gender identity. In other words, under this framework, both the
private and public aspects of one's sexual or gender identity would be protected
as a legitimate choice of sexual self-determination.
This view of deliberative sexual autonomy yields several real-world
advantages. To begin, as this article has suggested, current pressures in gay
civil rights-to come out, to speak out--often simplify, and hence reduce, the
value of public deliberation about the intersection of sexual autonomy and
sexual orientation generally. By linking gay civil rights to sexual orientation
alone, the substitutive model diminishes the value that a deliberative autonomy
model offers. However, because a deliberative autonomy model focuses on
personal choice, this model honors not only the complexity of sexual
orientation, but it confers value on the act of deliberation itself. Unlike the
substitutive model, which draws lines between gay/straight and out/closeted, a
deliberative autonomy rationale honors people's choices on personal identity
while still engaging them in the debate over gay rights.
Moreover, in practical terms, thinking in terms of sexual autonomy, rather
than sexual identity, forces the gay civil rights community to take a much more
actively inclusive approach to groups who are normally left out of the
355. See Kristen L. Walker, Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality, 6 ILSA J. OF INTL.
& COMP. L. 343, 352 (2000).
356. See Hemandez-Montiel vs. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
357. Id. at 1093.
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traditional substitutive paradigm. Using sexual autonomy as a conceptual
framework avoids the problems of exclusion of men who have sex with men in
India, for example, who are often left outside of categories of protection based
on "sexual orientation," because these men tend to view themselves as
heterosexual. Under the substitutive paradigm, as I have discussed, such
individuals are cast as "closeted" or "unliberated" for their failure to name
themselves as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. However, under a sexual autonomy
paradigm, such individuals can adopt whatever identity they may choose. The
emphasis is on the ability to choose identity, rather than on the requirement to
do so. Since no particular "sexual orientation" or "naming" is required for
inclusion, the sexual autonomy framework includes the additive model
discussed in Part V.
In addition, the deliberative autonomy framework takes the right of privacy
a further step by allowing an individual a kind of "inviolate space" in which to
make decisions about how to identify oneself sexually. It also contrasts with
the right to equality espoused by gay rights activists in that it does not require a
particular "sexual orientation" (or perception thereof) in order to qualify for
legal entitlement from discrimination. Instead, a deliberative sexual autonomy
framework provides a much more expansive view of protection, encompassing
both the internal and external aspects of a person. This framework also happily
coexists with identity-based models; as the Indian case against Section 377
suggests, it is entirely possible to have a nondiscrimination clause based on
sexual orientation and to construe the right to privacy to include the
deliberative and expressive aspects of a person's sexual identity.
In sum, the presence of an autonomy-based model reduces the need to rely
on identity-based protections because it avoids some of the problems faced by
an overreliance on identity, and provides an alternative strategy of legislative or
constitutional protection.358
As we have seen, some identity-based models can be appropriate vehicles
of constitutional protection for some individuals who readily adopt the category
358. Even though the right of sexual autonomy is extraordinarily important, Schulhofer valuably
observes that sexual autonomy is a "missing entitlement;" meaning that sexual autonomy does not rank
among the list of fundamental entitlements granted by law-entitlements to life, liberty and to labor.
Indeed, he explains that because laws governing rape have been so preoccupied with the presence of
force and coercion (in other words, the presence of physically violent misconduct), that judges and
legislators have missed a much more important right: the right of a woman to control access to her own
body. Schulhofer argues:
Sexual autonomy should not exist so precariously, as a mere by-product of the law's
restrictions on the use of force. It is an independent interest, in one of the most important
interests for any free person. A decent regime for safeguarding fundamental rights should
place sexual autonomy at the center of attention and protect it directly, for its own sake, just
as we protect physical safety, property, labor, and informational privacy, the core interests of
every human being.
Id. at 100-02. Again, while Schulhofer's observations are contextualized within the sphere of
examining rape laws in the United States, I believe that they can be valuably extended towards other
areas of potential coercion, particularly towards the realm of sexual identity itself.
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of "gay" or "lesbian." Yet such models often require individuals to "name"
themselves or "come out" as an implicit prerequisite. However, a sexual
autonomy framework allows for protection on the basis of both privacy and
identity. It requires only that individuals have the right to determine their own
preferences, orientations, and identities. And, as the Indian experience has
shown, a sexual autonomy framework, quite unlike the current overreliance on
a substitutive equation between identity and conduct, avoids the accusation that
it is a Western export because it builds on preexisting localized jurisprudence
and civil rights movements for its efficacy.
Finally, a sexual autonomy model is most clearly akin to the original goals
and objectives of the gay liberation movement. Following the Stonewall
Incident in 1969, gay liberation was conceptualized as a multi-intersectional
movement that connected threads of various struggles.359 In pointing out that
gender and sex roles oppress everyone, not just gay people, gay liberationists
originally sought "not only recognition of homosexuality as a legitimate
identity for a minority population but also to 'free the homosexual in
everyone.' 3 60 A sexual autonomy model does just that: it equalizes one's
sexual and identity preferences by focusing on the act of choosing, rather than
the gender or identity chosen, as a focal point of protection. Instead of gay
rights affecting a small, discernible minority population, a sexual autonomy
model seeks to transform social attitudes to gender and sexuality-the original
goals of the gay liberationist movement.36 1 Destroying categories of
homosexuality and heterosexuality should be a central, focal, point of
discussion,362 in stark contrast to the current overreliance on "sexual
orientation" as a vehicle for constitutional protection.
Using a sexual autonomy model invigorates these basic foundations of gay
liberation. Even though line-drawing between gay and straight may be
politically strategic, as the United States' experience has sometimes shown, it
obscures a more important goal: respecting people's autonomy to embrace a
more fluid conception of sexuality and sexual orientation.363 In other words,
359. See ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, supra note 97, at 34-35.
360. 1d. at 40.
361. In stark contrast to the value and attention placed on the current image of the "masculine" gay
male, gay liberationists of the 1970s actively sought to build connections between feminism and gay
liberation by focusing on effeminacy as a rallying point for revolution. Id. at 39.
362. As put by Judy Grahn, "if anyone were allowed to fall in love with anyone, the word
'homosexual' would not be needed." Id. at 42.
363. For this reason, I again draw attention to the mandate issued by IGLHRC, which observes the
importance of sexual self-determination:
Our constituency therefore includes people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and
anyone living with HIV or AIDS. A US based non-profit, non-governmental organization
(NGO), IGLHRC responds to such human rights violations around the world through
documentation, advocacy, coalition building, public education, and technical assistance. Our
overarching commitment is to defend the rights of people worldwide to define their own
sexualities and gender identities.
See www.iglhrc.org/about/index.html (last visited May 18, 2002) (emphasis added).
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the destruction of categories, a critical focus of the original gay rights
movement-seems to have been actively (and paradoxically) overlooked by
current models of gay rights, who often claim protection based on contingent
(and largely fictional) categories of identity. As I have argued, such categories
rarely challenge existing categories and also exclude many individuals who are
equally deserving of protection. In contrast, a sexual autonomy framework
includes individuals who need and deserve such protections by allowing them
the freedom to choose how to express themselves, and then by protecting them
from discrimination on this basis.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This is a time of great irony in gay rights. At no other time has global gay
rights been so successful and so deeply contested. The recent emergence of
gay or lesbian-identified individuals across the globe have created complex
ruptures in existing social fabrics, calling into question the universality of legal
constructs involving sexuality and culture.
As I have argued, global gay rights movements may eventually do serious
harm to themselves if they continue to exclude alternative constructions of the
relationship between identity and conduct among sexual minorities, and to
propagate a single, substitutive, formulation of the two. For example, one of
the most critical accounts of cultural difference among South Asian same-sex
sexualities opens with a quote from Gabriel Garcia Marquez, which observes:
It is only natural that they insist on measuring us with the yardstick
that they use for themselves, forgetting that the ravages of time are not
the same for all, and that the quest of our own identity is just as
arduous and bloody as it was for them. The interpretation of our
reality through pattems not our own serves to make us ever more
unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary.3 4
As the selection of this quote implicitly suggests, the current model of gay
civil rights is problematic not only because it relies on an overly constrictive
form of identity, but also because it alienates the very people such rights are
supposed to protect. As a result, what some see as gay liberation, others see as
a colonizing conflict of identity; where the complexities of desire and
experience are forcibly mapped onto a shifting and ultimately unpredictable
terrain. As one author in The Economist ruefully concluded several years ago,
"[I]n effect, what McDonald's has done for food and Disney has done for
entertainment, the global emergence of ordinary gayness is doing for sexual
culture. 365
364. See SHIVANANDA KHAN, supra note 178, at 31 (quoting Gabriel Garcia Marquez).
365. It's Normal to be Queer, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 84.
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For the substitutive model of gay rights contains a paradox: its overly
limiting view of the relationship between identity and conduct excludes
alternative configurations from its purview. Recall that the substitutive
equation between identity and conduct is markedly inappropriate for
transgendered individuals, who often find their gender identity to be
transformative of their sexual identity. And this invisibility is replicated in
other situations-for example, some men who engage in same-sex sexual
conduct see themselves as heterosexual, and thus cannot fit into the prescribed
mold so easily. Instead of the presumed substitutive relationship between
identity and conduct, these individuals demonstrate that their same-sex sexual
conduct may be additive to, and separate from, their sexual identities.
These different social meanings mean that it has become increasingly
difficult (and often inappropriate) to generalize about how certain countries, or
certain contexts, may treat homosexuality. Yet, many gay rights activists
persist in utilizing the substitutive model as the only "proper" relationship
between identity and conduct, thereby reinterpreting the world in their own
image and on their own terms.366 There remains a tendency to view same-sex
sexual activity that does not fit this mold as "underdeveloped," and to
recommend that lesbians and gay men in developing nations "catch up" with
the rest of the Western world.367 As a result, the current discourse surrounding
the globalization of gay rights tends to assume that an American-style model of
gay identity is a "universal human condition, impeded only by shame and
social stigma elsewhere in the world.
3 68
As I have argued, nothing could be further from the truth. But under the
substitutive paradigm prefigured throughout law, such alternative sexualities-
like those we have seen in Thailand, Sambia, India, and Mexico-are often
excluded from the traditional platforms of gay civil rights. For laws that
premise their protections on "sexual orientation" require self-identification of a
gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity, but they also risk alienating others who vastly
deserve protection. As commentator Frank Browning has observed, "A system
of gay-identity politics may well sweep the world, like so much of Western
commercial culture, but it may also prove as repressive and imperial as the old
bigotries already in place. 369 In this sense, ideas of "gay liberation" serve "not
as emancipatory slogans" but impose external categories onto widely divergent
peoples,37 ° thus obscuring the inherent value of fluidity and deliberation in
sexual identity.
366. See SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 1-2 ("it is very easy for the West, with its dominance of the
cultural as well as the economic arena, to re-interpret the world in its own image and on its own
terms.").
367. See Lesbian Emergence, supra note 121, at 64, quoting ALAN SINFIELD, GAY AND AFTER 68
(1998).
368. BROWNING, supra note 4, at 25.
369. BROWNING, supra note 4, at 28.
370. SEABROOK, supra note 277, at 1-2.
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Instead of excluding these other frameworks from protection, it is time to
construe the substitutive model more broadly, and accept the multiple co-
existence of different subjectivities and identities. The only way to accomplish
this goal is to focus on sexual autonomy, and its expressive and deliberative
aspects-as an alternative vehicle for protection. By doing so, we can
ultimately recognize that there are multiple models of gay liberation and
identity that take very different forms than the substitutive model favored by
existing legal protections.
Consequently, reassessing the utility of the substitutive paradigm carries
important lessons for gay rights activists in any locality. And ultimately, by
studying how different frameworks are excluded, we can create a more
sophisticated, inclusive approach that integrates protections for sexual
minorities with preexisting social meanings. By utilizing a vision of
deliberative sexual autonomy while seeking civil rights protections based on
both privacy and identity, we can honor the complex process of identity
formation while still recognizing the need for equality on the basis of sexual
orientation.
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